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Abstract 
We use discrete-choice theory to construct a fitness-landscape function for a bi-axial decision-
making map that plots the magnitude of social influence in the learning process against the costs and 
payoffs of decisions.  Specifically, we use econometric and statistical methods to estimate not only the 
fitness function but also movements along the map axes.  In terms of a Sewell Wright fitness-landscape 
function, cultural learning represents a novel problem in that an optimal decision depends not only on 
intrinsic utility of the decision/behavior but also on transparency of costs and benefits, the degree of social 
versus individual learning, and the relative popularity of each possible choice in a population.  This 
recursive relationship means that multiple equilibria can exist.  To search for these we employ a hill-
climbing algorithm that leads to the expected values of optimal decisions, which we define as peaks on the 
fitness landscape.  We illustrate how estimation of a measure of transparency, a measure of social 
influence, and the associated fitness landscape can be accomplished using panel data sets. 
Keywords: Discrete choice; Fitness landscape; Individual learning; Payoffs; Social learning 
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21. Introduction
Whether in the world of humans or other social animals, the evolution of behavior 
involves decisions made in the context of other agents. When agents are faced with 
making decisions involving multiple options, they can do one of two things. They can 
either learn individually, where they attempt to think things through by themselves, or 
they can learn socially by using other agents as sources of information. We can think of 
the former as information producers and the latter as information scroungers (Mesoudi 
2008). The question is how to estimate the balance and accuracy of these processes from 
observational data and then to assess how those factors affect fitness. This paper 
represents another step toward the ultimate goal of estimating a fitness-landscape 
function over the map of decision making of Bentley et al. (2014) by using panel data 
sets in which social interactions are present.  As we explain in section 3, the map has two 
axes—a north–south axis reflecting “transparency” in decision making, where 
transparency increases as one moves northward, and an east–west axis of social influence 
in decision making, where social influence increases as one moves eastward. 
Progress toward that goal was made in Brock et al. (2014), in which we adapted 
econometric and statistical work on multinomial logit models (Amemiya, 1985, chap. 9; 
Anderson et al., 1992; Greene, 2003, chap. 21) to estimate discrete-choice models with 
variable intensity of choice—our measure of transparency—and variable social-
interaction strength.  Here we extend that work by formulating a precise concept of 
fitness function that can be estimated.  To do this, we focus on multiple equilibria, which 
Brock et al. (2014) did not cover, and sketch an approach to estimation of the fitness 
landscape in the presence of multiple equilibria. Brock et al. (2014) also did not discuss 
3plausible dynamics, in the spirit of Samuelson’s (1941, 1947) correspondence principle.  
Samuelson argued that equilibrium would never be observed in the field if it were not 
stable with respect to a plausible dynamic out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.  We 
propose such an adjustment to pick out particular members of the set of multiple 
equilibria that appear when social interactions are strong enough.  We argue that unstable 
equilibria are not likely to be observed and that estimation should proceed in the presence 
of stable multiple equilibria and ignore unstable multiple equilibria.    
To place our study in a broader context, we summarize below some of the recent 
work that has been done in the area of cultural learning, given that it forms the foundation 
of the horizontal axis of our map.  We stress that the studies we mention do not deal with 
the actual estimation of fitness functions, nor do they deal with the particular concept of 
fitness function that we have borrowed from the discrete-choice econometric and 
statistical literature.  Finally, they do not deal with the computation of equilibria or 
provide a theory of which equilibria are likely to be observed when actual estimation is 
conducted in the presence of multiple equilibria.  Addressing these issues represents our 
contribution, and we believe a wide audience will find our approach to the formulation of 
fitness functions and their estimation to be useful.  Readers might note that in our brief 
review we use words and phrases such as “transparency,” “social conformity,” and 
“social interactions,” which are subject to the imprecision of words in contrast to the 
precision of the mathematical concepts of “transparency” and “social conformity” that we 
develop later in a context amenable to estimation techniques from econometrics and 
statistics. 
42. Social influence: a key element in decision making
Within any population, the precise mixture of individual, or independent (asocial), 
learners versus social learners—a dichotomy sometimes referred to as information 
“producers” versus information “scroungers” (Mesoudi, 2008; Rendell et al., 2011)—
may be crucial to a group’s ability to climb a rugged fitness landscape (Rogers, 1995; 
Mesoudi and Whiten, 2008; Rendell et al., 2010; O’Brien et al., 2015).  The reason for 
this is that while social learning spreads behaviors, it depends on individual learning to 
generate them in the first place.  The question is, when should an agent do one as 
opposed to the other, and how does the shift affect fitness?  Or, more precisely, how does 
an agent integrate social and individual learning (Perreault et al., 2012)?  Several studies 
have examined this question (e.g., Giraldeau et al., 2002; Kendal et al., 2009), many 
building on Rogers’ (1988) earlier modeling.  Rogers proposed that environmental 
change lowers the fitness of a group comprising individual and social learners because 
the latter cannot track new changes in the environment and thus will copy outdated 
information from each other (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2011; Rieucau and 
Giraldeau, 2011).  If the environment does not change, group fitness increases because 
social learners are adopting optimal behaviors, and it costs less to scrounge than to 
produce, unless producers charge a price for copying.  Similarly, Perreault et al. (2012) 
found that natural selection favors agents who place heavy weight on social cues when 
the environment changes slowly or when its state cannot be well predicted using 
individual learning. 
There should exist in a population an optimally adaptive mix of the two learning 
strategies, but that does not insure that this optimal mix will occur, as other steady-state 
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mixes might exist.  Numerous studies suggest that about 5% of informed individuals are 
enough to guide a social group (e.g., schooling fish) to a destination (Dyer et al., 2009; 
Herbert-Read et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013; Kurvers et al., 2014).  Among that minority, 
this “pied piper” effect is augmented by intensity of direction (Couzin et al., 2011), which 
we might generalize as the “intensity of choice” (Bentley et al., 2014), or the 
accumulation of knowledge (Gomes, 2006). 
More generally, the benefits of social learning are substantial enough for it to 
have been a key factor in human evolution (Hruschka, 2010; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013; 
Christakis and Fowler, 2014).  Small groups can outperform even the most 
skilled/knowledgeable individual on complex tasks (Woolley et al., 2010) and in 
remembering information (Clément et al., 2013).  In traditional societies, social learning 
is usually transparent, as experts in different essential categories of adaptive knowledge 
(medicinal plants, hunting, fishing, cultivation) are well known to the group members 
(Henrich and Broesch, 2011).  Over generations, well-directed social learning increases 
collective knowledge—teachers to students, parents to children, experts to general 
communities. 
Recent experiments (e.g., Salganik et al., 2006; Lorenz et al., 2011) show that 
providing information about what others are doing—downloading music, estimating 
quantities on survey questions—yields herding behavior that reduces the diversity of 
independent judgments within trials but increases variance between trials, thereby 
reducing the accuracy of the aggregated mean of those judgments.  If misinformation 
invades the social-learning process, false alarms can spread (Couzin et al., 2005).  As 
information spreads between, say, Facebook or Twitter friends (Aral et al., 2009; Bond et 
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al., 2012; Garcia-Herranz et al., 2014), expertise is not necessarily transparent to all 
members of the networks.  In cases where expertise is not transparent, a good strategy 
might be to copy recent success (Laland, 2004).  A social-learning tournament hosted by 
St Andrews University in 2009 showed that when success is transparent, it can be enough 
just to know what learned behaviors have recently been successful (Rendell et al., 2010).  
Schools and flocks may be seen as “copying the recent”: When flocking agents are 
copying their neighbors’ current direction of travel, the information is available 
practically instantaneously (Couzin et al., 2005). 
Debate exists, however, over whether it is possible to demonstrate social learning 
with observational data without resorting to strong a priori assumptions (Shalizi and 
Thomas, 2011; Thomas, 2013; Hobaiter et al., 2014).  In other words, how do we 
distinguish between genuine social influence and individual discovery?  The “three-
degrees-of-influence” hypothesis concerning behaviors that spread within human social 
networks beyond one’s immediate friends (Christakis and Fowler 2013) can also be 
explained by simple autocorrelation through individual discovery combined with 
homophily—the tendency for individuals with similar traits to co-associate (Brock and 
Durlauf, 2001; Aral et al., 2009; Thomas, 2013).  We return to the issue of homophily 
later. 
 
3.  A bi-directional map of decision making  
There are two important factors, or “dimensions,” in terms of how decisions are 
made in the face of multiple options: the magnitude of social influence in the learning 
process and the transparency of costs and payoffs to either social learning or individual 
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learning.  These two dimensions, together with how they change over time, are the 
essence of discrete-choice theory with social influence (Brock and Durlauf 2001; Brock 
et al. 2014).  This led us to propose a theoretical framework grounded in a bi-axial map 
that extracts, from observational data, the transparency of decisions and the extent to 
which a behavior is acquired socially versus individually (Fig. 1) (Bentley and O’Brien, 
2011; Bentley, Earls, and O’Brien, 2011; Bentley, O’Brien, and Ormerod, 2011; Bentley 
et al., 2014; Bentley and O’Brien, 2015).  The horizontal axis represents the learning 
continuum, as we aim to identify popularity-data signatures that distinguish individually 
motivated actions from those driven by social influence.  The vertical axis captures how 
transparent the payoffs of actions and/or their role models are.  The map is integrative: 
unbiased copying, for example, maps into the southeast quadrant, rational choice in the 
northwest, and well-informed social learning (e.g., from high-ranking individuals or 
renowned experts, i.e., prestige bias [Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Atkisson et al., 
2012]) in the northeast.  The map attempts to link the population-level temporal dynamics 
of behavior frequencies to the acquisition of social/environmental information that 
underlies agents’ decisions. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 1 
______________________ 
 
In resolving both axes simultaneously, the map calls for traditional and novel 
forms of time-series analysis of the form and dynamics of popularity distributions cross-
8referenced with studies from individuals and populations (Brock et al., 2014).  We have 
parameterized the functions that underlie the map so that we can estimate paths through 
it.  The vertical axis, which we parameterize as bt, represents the transparency of an 
individual’s decision and its consequences—costs and payoffs—from absolute 
transparency along the northern edge (bt = ) to complete opaqueness along the southern 
edge (bt = 0).  The horizontal axis, measured by parameter Jt, represents the extent to 
which a decision is made, from purely individually at the western edge (Jt = 0) to purely 
social decision making, or copying, at the eastern edge (Jt = ).  This allows a 
parameterization in terms of how probability, Pk, of choice k (versus null-choice 
probability, P0) depends on transparency of choice and social influence.  Here the null 
choice, zero, is introduced to allow a choice made outside the set of options 1,2,…,N to 
serve as a useful baseline option.  It is also useful in tidying up notation when writing 
log-odds regression equations in discrete-choice estimation theory. 
We follow Anderson et al. (1992, chap. 2, especially app. 2.10.4) in developing 
the relatively standard background from discrete-choice theory that eventually leads to 
the estimation equation discussed later (see also Greene [2003] and especially Amemiya 
[1985, chap. 9]).  At each date t assume there are i = 1,2,…,I persons making choices 
from a set {0,1,2,…,N} of choices.  An individual, i, is assumed to face N primary 
choices of interest plus another choice, denoted by zero.  We assume the payoff of any 
given choice k to person i at date t consists of a deterministic term, ( , )tU i k , and a 
random term,  t (i,k) .  We assume the latter is distributed identically and independently 
across people, choices, and dates.  We also add the restriction used by Anderson et al. 
(1992, eqs. 2.30 and 2A.6) that the distribution of the random term is a double-
9exponential distribution with shape parameter t .  Note that t is allowed to change over 
time.  Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.30) show that if there are no social effects, i.e., 
2( , ) 0itJ y = , the probability that person i chooses choice k at date t is given by
Pt (i,k) =
1
Zt
e(1/t )Ut ( i,k ) ,k = 0,1,2,..., N
Zt  e(1/t )Ut ( i, j )
j=1
N ,t = 1,2,...,T .
(3.1)
It is common to denote 1/t tb   and call it the “intensity of choice.”  Anderson 
et al. (1992, eq. 2A.13) show that variance in the decision making of person i is 
proportional to 2t .  We therefore define our transparency measure as bt.  The motivation 
for defining transparency in this manner is that the larger bt is, the smaller the variance in
decision making across the alternatives.   As we point out in more detail elsewhere 
(Bentley et al., 2014), the intensity of choice, bt, is a precise and useful way to model the 
concept of transparency at each date t, where (1) bt = 0 corresponds to the lowest level of 
transparency—noise in choice is so large that choice is completely random over the 
choice set; and (2) bt =  corresponds to the highest level of transparency—the relative 
values of payoffs of each choice are so high that there is no doubt as to which choice 
yields the highest payoff.
The question might be asked whether the intensity-of-choice measure, tb , from 
discrete-choice theory is a useful measure to an econometrician or statistician who is 
trying to use observational data on a set of decision makers to estimate and measure 
“transparency.”  Anderson et al. (1992, chap. 2) present an excellent discussion of this 
question.  As they point out, the origins of discrete-choice theory emerged from attempts 
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to model a single decision maker whose state of mind is randomly changing, and the 
theory came to be called the random utility model.  Randomness could arise from many 
causes, ranging from incomplete understanding of the values of the various options, to 
learning about the values of the various options, to inherent changes in the values of the 
options to the decision maker.  If none of this randomness were present in the mind of the 
decision maker, he or she would simply rank the options and choose the best one.  This is 
the polar case of infinite intensity of choice, tb = .
The opposite polar case is that of completely random choice due to reasons such as 
total ignorance about the values of the individual choice options, e.g., 0tb = , where each 
option is chosen with the same probability.  Anderson et al. (1992), quoting Manski (1977), 
list another interpretation of the discrete choice model: uncertainty is a result of the lack of 
information available to the modeler.  This could be due to nonobservable characteristics, 
nonobservable variations in individual utilities, measurement errors, and functional 
misspecifications.  Fortunately, “the two approaches lead to the same choice probabilities” 
(Anderson et al. 1992, p. 33).  For this reason we have decided to use the intensity-of-
choice measure, tb , as our measure of “transparency.”  When we use the word 
“transparency,” we are referring to tb  and will specify a functional form for tb  as a 
function of a parameter vector and observable characteristics.  We do not claim that this is 
the most useful definition of “transparency” in all contexts; rather, we claim that it enables 
us to make quantitative progress in some contexts. 
Returning to equation (3.1), note that it can be written in the equivalent log-odds 
form as 
11
ln
Pt (i,k)
Pt (i,0)



	 =
1
t



	 Ut (i,k)Ut (i,0)]= bt[Ut (i,k)Ut (i,0) 
 , (3.2)
which is handier for estimation purposes.  We now extend this development to include 
social effects, which we can include by replacing ( , )tU i k  with 
Vt (i,k) =Ut (i,k)+ Jt Pt (k), (3.3)
where ( )tP k  denotes the fraction of the community that chooses choice k at date t.
Suppose one has a set of characteristics of the N + 1 different available choices at 
dates t = 1,2,…,T, denoted by {xijt ,i = 1,2,..., I , j = 0,1,2,..., N ,t = 1,2,...,T}.  Suppose also 
that one has a data set on individuals, i = 1,2,…,I that consists of variables that may 
impact the variance of decision making at each date, denoted by 
{ , 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., }itz i I t T= = .  Finally, suppose that one has a set of variables,
{yit ,i = 1,2,..., I ,t = 1,2,...,T}, that should enter the function J (2 , yit ) .  Note that that 
function parameterizes the social influence on choices made by individual i.  We also 
assume for estimation purposes that we have data on the average choice fractions, 
( ), 0,1,2,...,tP j j N= , made by the community.  Given these data, we write the estimating 
equation from Brock et al. (2014, eq. 5) that is appropriate for implementation by non-
linear least squares (NLLS), as
( ){ }1 0 2( , )ln ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) (0) ,( ,0)
t
it ikt i t it t t
t
P i k b z x x J y P k P
P i
    =  +   	
             (3.4) 
where 1 2( , , )   is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 
1 0( , ) ( ,0) ( )t t ikt i tU i k U i x x =  .
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Recall that the characteristic iktx  is a scalar here.  It is easy to generalize the treatment of 
characteristics to the case where they are vectors. 
Here we repeat that our estimating equation is motivated by the underlying theory 
from, for example, equations (3.2) and (3.3).  Brock et al. (2014) developed this 
framework and showed how estimation of the parameter vector ( ,1,2 )  can be done in 
practice by trying it out on simulated data, but they did not address conceptualizing and 
estimating a useful specification of fitness function or how to deal with multiple 
equilibria.  We take up these issues below, after briefly discussing potential biases we 
face in conducting estimation procedures using field data. 
Once we have estimates of the parameter vector, ( ,1,2 ) —denote these 
estimates as 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , )   —we may insert them into the social surplus function, ( )S V , of
Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.37), which we slightly modify in equation (3.5) 
( / )
0 0
1
( ; , ) ln (1/ ( 1)) ln (1/ ( 1)) ,k k
N N
V bV
k k
F p b J N e N e
b

= =
    = + = + 	    
                (3.5) 
to obtain an estimate tˆF .  This object is our estimated fitness function.  It can change
over time because although the estimate of the parameter vector 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , )    does not
change, the vector of covariates can.  In this way, we not only obtain an estimate of a 
path 0ˆ ˆ{ ( , ), ( , )}
T
it it tb z J y  =  but also an estimate tˆF  over time for fitness along the
estimated path 0ˆ ˆ{ ( , ), ( , )}
T
it it tb z J y  = in the floor of our map of decision making.  We
discuss this in more detail below. 
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The parameterization of tJ  by the function Jt = J (2 , yit )  is for estimation 
purposes. Regarding the social-learning dimension, J, we assume that social utility is 
positively influenced by relative popularity, by letting J   0 denote the strength of social 
influence on decision making.  Although for specificity we will emphasize the case of 
positive association with relative popularity, note that in equation (3.4) J (2 , yit )  could 
be negative, which might represent anticonformity, for example. 
Our goal has been to extract these dimensions from observational data.  Using 
simulated data, we showed in an earlier paper (Brock et al., 2014) how functions 
representing bt and Jt could be specified in terms of data and a vector of parameters and 
how these parameters could be estimated by NLLS.  We generated noisy random values 
of “real” variables x, y, and z and used NLLS and our parameterization above to see how 
well we could recover the dimensions b (north–south) and J (east–west).  In Fig. 2, the 
red dots are simulated data, and the blue dots are our estimates.  One can see that the 
largest discrepancies between model and data lie in the north–south dimension.  This is 
because the expected value of the optimal decision, made over N possible choices, needs 
to be computed for a given set of parameters of the payoffs to the decision makers.  The 
problem lies in the multiple equilibria that appear as social influence becomes strong in 
an environment where there are many possible choices. 
  
______________________ 
Figure 2 
______________________ 
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Here we show how to compute the expected value of the optimal decision as a 
function of the basic parameters of the environment for deciding among N possible 
choices.  Our objective is to estimate the functions b(.) and J(.) simultaneously (Brock et 
al., 2014), and we need to be aware of the difficulties in distinguishing between 
homophily and social causation.  As far as we know, Goldbaum and Mizrach (2008) are 
the only ones to estimate the function (.)b  as a function of observable covariates.  
However, they did not discuss estimation of social influence and potential biases caused 
by selection bias and correlated unobservables or estimation of a fitness function.  In fact, 
estimates of the function J(.) may be picking up any kind of “social” correlation.  It is 
important to realize that more research is needed on methods to remove this kind of bias in 
estimations of (.), (.)b J  and that these biases will cause biases in the estimation of the 
corresponding fitness function tˆF .  Some limited progress was made by Brock and 
Durlauf (2006) in correcting for selection bias in estimates of (.)J caused by similar 
agents choosing to be members of the same reference group, but their method does not 
correct for all bias that might appear in estimates of (.)b .  Detailed development of 
methods to correct estimates of (.), (.)b J  for biases of the type mentioned above is beyond 
the scope of this article, but it is important to at least briefly mention the problem, given 
the confusion and controversy it has caused in the literature (e.g., Shalizi and Thomas 
2010; Thomas 2013). 
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4.  Optimal decisions among many options under social influence 
Samuelson (1941, 1947) argued in his correspondence principle that an 
equilibrium would not be observed in a field setting unless it were stable with respect to a 
plausible out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.  This notion has been debated since and 
is being debated today (e.g., Echenique 2008).  The main point of contention is over what 
should serve as a plausible out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.  We formulate a 
process below that seems to make sense.  For ease of presentation, we change the 
notation slightly by deleting the person index, i, and the date index, t. We will also think 
of the out-of-equilibrium adjustment dynamics as occurring on a faster time scale than 
the time scale of change in the observable variables that drive changes in the intensity of 
choice and social influence.  Looking ahead, we argue that unstable equilibria with 
respect to our out-of-equilibrium adjustment process are unlikely to appear in any 
observational data set.  This is the reason why it is worthwhile to spend time below 
exploring properties of the adjustment process.  Finally, we note that it is notationally 
more convenient to drop the “baseline” choice labeled zero and work with choices 
labeled 1,2,...,k N= .
Consider an environment consisting of N possible decisions, each with payoff 
Uk, k = 1, 2,…, N.  As previously, we let b  0 denote the transparency of the payoff 
values of the decisions.  With zero transparency (b = 0), decision makers have zero 
confidence in their evaluation of payoffs, so they select choice k = 1, 2, …N with 
probability 1/N, i.e., completely randomly.  With complete transparency, b —> , agents 
can choose the highest payoff option with probability one.   
 16
In the discrete-choice literature, the utility of different choices consists of a 
deterministic utility, ktU , plus an element of randomness, t  kt , as 
 
Ukt =Ukt + t  kt ,k = 1,2,..., N ,t = 1,2,...,T                           (4.1)   
Here we have placed subscripts to indicate that when discussing estimation we allow the 
utilities as well as the parameter t  to change over time.  In instances where we are 
simply explaining the basics of discrete-choice theory, we drop the date subscript to 
reduce notation. 
The deterministic part of each payoff, Uk, can be ranked as U1 > U2 > … > UN, 
such that, without loss of generality, when X is small, most choices will be clustered 
around choice number 1.  As X becomes large, the choice probabilities spread out across 
the N choices, approaching a uniform distribution as X becomes very large.  Because our 
intensity-of-choice function, b(.), is inversely related to X, the farther north we go on the 
map, the more tightly the distribution of choices clusters around the maximum 
deterministic payoff.  This is what motivates our estimation of the b(.) as a function of 
observable covariates (Brock et al., 2014). 
As previously, the deterministic component of utility when social effects are 
present is given by 
Vk =Uk + Jpk , k = 1,2,..., N . (4.2)  
Actual utility of choice, k, is random and consists of the deterministic component, kV ,
and a random component,  k , that is distributed double exponentially with scale 
parameter  . The random component is distributed independently and identically across 
choices.  As Anderson et al (1992, p. 60) show, this implies that the pairwise difference 
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of the random components is distributed logistically with zero mean and variance,
2 2 2 / 6  = .  Hence, we write the random utility as 
 
Vk =Vk +  k , k = 1,2,..., N . (4.3)  
 An important and standard quantity from discrete choice theory (Anderson et al 
1992, pp. 60–61), which we shall use later, is the expectation of the maximum of the 
random utilities across choices, 
 
E{max k{1,2,...,N } Vk}= S(V ) =  ln e(Vk / )
k=1
N


= 1
b


	

 ln e
bVk
k=1
N


, (4.4)
where 1/b  .  The quantity ( )S V  can be thought of as a welfare measure for an 
individual facing this particular choice environment. 
Our preliminary goal is to show how ((b(.), J(.)) in a population of agents facing 
N possible choices determines the fitness of the optimal decision in the population.  For 
such a population, the maximum payoff for each fixed value of ((b(.), J(.)) is the expected 
value of the optimal decision, i.e., the “fitness function.”  This is a novel problem because 
the optimal decision depends not only on intrinsic utility, Uk, but also on transparency, b, 
and social learning, J, as well as on the relative popularity, pk, of each of the N possible 
choices.  This recursive relationship means that multiple equilibria can exist and that the 
fitness function may also change over time as ((b(.), J(.)) changes.  
To keep things simple to start, we fix the values of b and J.  We can think of (b, 
J) as changing on a slower time scale than the faster dynamics that give rise to the 
optimal decision.  By assuming that (b, J) are constant over this faster time scale, we will 
introduce an algorithm that computes equilibria as well as points on our fitness landscape.  
Even with fixed b and J, we still face the problem of multiple equilibria, so we start by 
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computing equilibrium solutions for the extreme values (zero and infinity) of b and J.  
Then, when there are multiple equilibria, we argue that certain “natural” equilibria will be 
unique for each pair of b and J.   
We start with the multinomial logit framework for the general case of N choices 
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001), in which the probability of choice k (from 1 to N) is given by 
pk =
1
ebUi+bJpi
i=1
N e
bUk+bJpk , k = 1,2,..., N ,                             (4.5) 
where k = 1, 2,…N indexes the N different choices.  It is a fixed-point equation because 
we must find a vector ( p1, p2 ,..., pN )  of probabilities that simultaneously satisfies both 
sides of equation (4.5) for k = 1,2,…, N. We have explained how the choice probabilities 
given in equation (4.5) are derived from the random utilities (Anderson et al., 1992, eq. 
2.30).  Recall that  is the shape parameter of the double-exponential distribution 
function (Anderson et al., 1992, eq. 2A.6) and that 1/b   by definition. We add an 
extra term to the usual expected value of the optimal decision, ( )S V  (Anderson et al., 
1992, eq. 2.37), in order to build the fitness function that we want to compute.  Our 
fitness function is given by  
 
F( p;b, J )  E{max i{1,2,...,N } Vk}+ 1b ln
1
N




 = S(V )+
1
b
ln
1
N





= 1
b
ln
1
N
ebUk+bJpk
k=1
N	


.
(4.6) 
As an interim measure of “fitness” in equation (4.6), we have taken the standard discrete-
choice measure of welfare, ( )S V , and added the term 1
b
ln
1
N



 . Note that this does not 
change the partial derivatives with respect to Uk or pk for k = 1, 2,…, N.  Here, 
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.  If we knew how to compute a “natural” choice of equilibrium vector, 
call it , to solve the N equations (4.5), we could define our fitness-landscape 
function as .  We will develop what we mean by a “natural” 
equilibrium in Section 5.
This modification of adding the constant term 
1
b
ln
1
N



  to the formula for the 
term 
 
E{max i{1,2,...,N } Vk}  in Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.37) turns out to have some useful 
properties.  One is that we can address the problem of multiple equilibria first by 
computing equilibrium solutions for the extreme values b = 0, and J = 0,.  For J = 0, 
the solution of (4.5) is unique.  Further, for , 
 
b 0,  implies, F( p;b,0) ( 1
N
) Uk
k=1
N
b, implies, F( p;b,0)max{Uk} .                                    
(4.7) 
 
(See Appendix 1 for a short proof of 4.7.) Suppose one plots the “fitness function” (4.6) 
on the vertical axis and plots (b, J) on the horizontal axis of a graphical display of a 
“fitness landscape.”  We can see right away from our results (4.7) that if one draws the 
peaks for the far west side of the map, where J = 0, one will see the height of the peak 
rising as b increases.  For J = 0, the height will rise from the average payoff at the far 
south, i.e., where b = 0, to the maximum of the payoffs as one heads north. 
For finite J > 0, writing pk(b) to emphasize the dependence of pk on the value of 
b, we have  
p  ( p1,..., pN )
*( , )p b J
W (b, J )  F( p *(b, J );b, J )
0J =
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1
0,  ,  ( ; , ) (1/ ) ( (0))
(0) 1/ , 1,2,...,
,  ,  ( ; ,0) max{ ( )}
( ) 1
N
k k
k
k
k k
k
b implies F p b J N U Jp
p N k N
b implies F p b U Jp
p
=
  +
= =
  + 
 =

                       (4.8)   
Suppose we rank the deterministic payoffs as mentioned above, with U1 > U2 > … > UN, 
and U1 as the maximum payoff.  We have already seen for the case J = 0 that one can 
prove that p1 —> 1 as b —> .  However, for 0 < b < , the next result shows that 
multiple equilibria will appear when J becomes large enough.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
one can show that when J —> , for any choice k, there is an equilibrium where the 
probability that k is chosen is one.  This is because we are restricting ourselves to settings 
where the social utility of a choice correlates positively with its popularity (we recognize 
there will be many settings where this is not the case).  As choice k becomes more 
popular, the social payoff (4.2) rises to the point where it surpasses the intrinsic part of 
the payoff and an agent can simply conform to the majority choice of the community 
(McElreath et al., 2008). 
To summarize, we see that for J —> , the equilibria, i.e., limiting fixed points, 
in (4.5) occur at pk = 1, and all other probabilities zero, for k = 1, 2, …, N.  If Uk = Uj = 0, 
then for J —> , the equilibria of (4.5) occur with pk = ½, pj = ½ for every pair k  j.  If 
Uk = Uj = Ul = 0, then for J —> , pk = 1/3, pj = 1/3, pl = 1/3 for every triplet k  j  l, and 
so on for all possible mixed-strategy equilibria.  Parenthetically, it might be argued that a 
discussion of limiting behavior and multiple equilibria, including mixed-strategy 
equilibria, is extraneous to the main goal of estimation of intensity of choice, social 
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influence, and fitness function, but we believe that it is important to have a solid 
understanding of the theory that lies behind the objects that one is trying to estimate.  
 
5.  The fitness landscape over multiple equilibria 
For large values of the social-learning parameter, J, there can be a plethora of 
equilibria.  We need to evaluate the fitness function F(p;b,J) at each of these equilibria in 
order to complete the fitness landscape discussed in Section 4.  We can start with small 
values of N = 2, 3, 4,… and then evaluate F(p;b,J) at each one of these equilibria in order 
to show the height of the fitness landscape at each value of (b, J).  We start with the case 
of N = 2, where we can compute the equilibria as 0b >  and 0J   vary by plotting a 
graph and using the constraint p1 + p2 = 1.  For N = 3 we can use p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 to 
reduce the problem to solving two equations in two unknowns, (p1,  p2), for each value of 
the vector (b, J), and in the general case we solve the equations below, where we have 
added a set of differential equations whose steady states are equilibria: 
1
1
/ ( ; , ),  0,  1,2,...,
1
/ ( ; , ) ,  1,2,...,
j jk k
N
bU bJpbU bJp
k k k
j
N
k
k
k k k
p e e f p b J p k N
p
dp dt f p b J p k N
++
=
=
=   =
=
=  =


(5.1)
 
 
Given that multiple equilibria may appear for b > 0 as J —> , where the 
fitness function itself may not be well defined or have infinite limit, which equilibrium 
should we use for the value of ( ; , )F p b J ?  We face the task of computing all the 
equilibria for each 0, 0b J>   and possibly picking the one that gives the largest value 
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of ( *( , ), , )F p b J b J .  However, we argue below that a better option is to specify a 
plausible out-of-equilibrium dynamic process in the form of a set of differential 
equations, i.e., a dynamical system whose steady states are equilibria (solutions of 
equations such as 5.1 for the general case of N  choices), and to simulate the dynamical 
system to identify equilibria that are local attractors for the dynamical system (5.1).  We 
labeled steady states that satisfy this local stability property “natural” equilibrium points.  
The motivation for this choice is that an “unnatural” equilibrium is unlikely to be 
observed, as was argued by Samuelson (1941, 1947).   
For this exploration, we make use of a Lyapunov function. The specific choice 
of Lyapunov function is not so important, as long as its gradient, where zero, yields a 
solution to equations 4.5 and 5.1.  We propose the following as our Lyapunov function:  
 H ( p;b, J )  F( p;b, J ) J
2
pk
2
k=1
N .                             (5.2)  
 
We claim that the partial derivatives of H  with respect to , 1,2,...,kp k N=  are all zero 
on equilibria and that L(p;b,J)  –H(p;b,J) acts like a Lyapunov function for the 
dynamical system, 
 
dpk
dt
= Hpk
= J e
bUk+bJpk
ebU j+bJp j
j=1
N
 pk




	

.
                             (5.3)
 
 
 23
Notice that this dynamical system is the same as the one in (5.1) except for the constant 
J , which does nothing but change the “speed” of the dynamics provided that 0J > , 
which we assume to be the case from this point on.  This system is essentially the same as 
the one in (5.1), except for the units of “time,” and is what we will use as our out-of-
equilibrium adjustment process in order to implement Samuelson’s (1941, 1947) 
correspondence principle.  We chose (5.3) because, as we will see, it has very nice 
mathematical properties and is, hence, quite easy to analyze.   
The dynamical system is a “gradient dynamical system,” that is, the right side of 
(5.3) is the gradient of a scalar function H(p;b,J).  It yields a handy “pseudo-Lyapunov” 
function, ( ; , ) ( ; , )L p b J H p b J=  .  We call L a “pseudo-Lyapunov” function because it 
does not satisfy the usual definiteness conditions for a Lyapunov function; however, it is 
still useful for computing equilibria.   
Intuitively, the dynamical system (5.3) “climbs” the function H(p;b,J) because it 
moves in the direction of the gradient vector ( ; , ) /H p b J p  .  Hence, we expect the 
system to stop climbing and come to rest on local maxima of the function, H(p;b,J).  We 
call these equilibria of (5.1), which are local maxima of H(p;b,J), “natural equilibria.”  
Samuelson’s correspondence principle demands that an equilibrium be “natural,” i.e., that 
it have a nonzero basin of attraction with respect to an out-of-equilibrium dynamical 
adjustment process, which we take to be the system (5.3).  The system will converge to 
that equilibrium if it starts near enough (in terms of that equilibrium).  The proof is 
simple, so we give it here.  We must show for  L(p;b,J)  –H(p;b,J) that / 0dV dt <  on 
solutions of (5.3) and is zero on solutions of (4.5), i.e., is zero on the set of equilibria.  Or, 
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to put it another way, it is zero on steady-state solutions of the differential equations 
(5.1). We have from (5.3) and the definition of L , 
2
1 1
/ / ( / )( / ) ( / ) 0
N N
k k k
k k
dL dt dH dt H p dp dt H p
= =
=  =    =    <  (5.4)  
 
Hence, 
dL
dt
= 0 iff Hpk
= 0,k = 1,2,...N .                                           (5.5)   
 
Note that the equilibrium that makes the function ( ; , )F p b J largest on the set of 
equilibria, call it *( , )p b J , may not be found by the process (5.3) because  *( , )p b J  
may not be a steady state of local attraction for the process (5.3), i.e., it is unstable with 
respect to the process (5.3).  We exclude such equilibria for the “Samuelsonian” reasons 
given above.  Recall equation (4.4), where we let **( , )p b J  denote the equilibrium that 
gives the largest value of F(p;b,J) over the set of natural equilibria. 
The function ( **( , ); , )F p b J b J appears to be the most natural candidate for a 
fitness-landscape function.  If so, this raises the question of whether the set of equilibria 
found by the hill-climbing algorithm (5.3) and the bottom-seeking version of (5.3), where 
we multiply the right side of (5.3) by –1, will contain the equilibrium that corresponds to 
**( , )p b J .  Provided that we grid the simplex 1
1
{( ,..., ) | 1}
N
N k
k
p p p
=
=  of non-negative 
probability vectors finely enough and solve the dynamical system (5.3) from each of 
these gridded initial conditions, we can be fairly certain that we will find all the “natural” 
equilibria and hence find the equilibrium we seek, **( , )p b J .   
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Some may argue for the use of a process other than (5.3), and we reiterate that it 
is only an example of a plausible candidate out-of-equilibrium process.  Whatever one’s 
view is on the usefulness of this particular process for implementing Samuelson’s 
correspondence principle, any estimation method of the fitness function, 
( / )
1 1
1
( ; , ) ln (1/ ) ln (1/ ) ,k k
N N
V bV
k k
F p b J N e N e
b

= =
    	= =  
        
which we implemented for estimation purposes above as the quantity tˆF  using 
observational data, is likely to be estimated only on equilibria that are “stable” with 
respect to some out-of-equilibrium adjustment process, assuming the system is in 
equilibrium in the first place. The vexing issue of how to usefully model how particular 
equilibria are actually approached by a social system remains an open problem.   
 
6.  Computing multiple equilibria  
In summary, we have defined a fitness function F(p; b,J), which is a modification 
of the Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.37) “social surplus” function, which itself is the 
expected value of the optimal decision, at a particular b,J coordinate with an optimal 
division of popularities, given by the vector of probabilities, pk, for each choice k = 1, 2, 
…, N among N options.  We use a Lyapunov function, H(p;b, J), to find each natural 
equilibrium with respect to (5.1), or, equivalently, (5.3), which is the same system up to 
speed of convergence.  Because there might be multiple peaks that are locally stable, we 
initialize our dynamical system over a range of pk(0).  In this way, we are able to find all 
of the natural equilibria and evaluate ( ; , )F p b J at each of these.  If **( , )p b J  is the 
choice probability vector that gives the largest value of ( ; , )F p b J  over the set of natural 
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equilibria, the fitness landscape will plot as ( **( , ); , )F p b J b J .  This entire landscape 
depends on Uk, the vector of utilities for all the different choices k = 1, 2,…, N, and could 
potentially be quite different for a different vector of intrinsic utilities of the N different 
choices.  
To sum up the relations among these variables, we have  
1
1
( ; , ), 1, 2,..., ,
k k
i i
k
i
bU bJp
k N
bU bJp
i
bV
N
bV
i
k
ep
e
e
e
f p b J k N
+
+
=
=
=

 =


(6.1)
F( p;b, J ) = 1
b
ln
1
N
ebUk+bJpk
k=1
N


,and (6.2)
2
1
( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( )
N
k
k
H p b J F p b J J p
=
=   .                                  ( 6.3)
Note that 
1
( ; , ) 1
N
k
k
f p b J
=
=
            (6.4) 
for all (p;b,J), such that pk (t)
k=1
N = 1  for all dates t. For given values of b and J, we use 
computer simulation to follow the gradient given by the Lypunov function.  In this 
simulation, we must first specify the intrinsic utilities of all N choices by the vector U.  
These intrinsic utility values do not change through the simulation.  We then choose an 
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initial set of pk values from p1,  p2,  p3, . . . pN, the sum of which is one.  In the case of our 
diagrams for N = 2 and N = 3, respectively, this means
1 2
1 2 3
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
p t p t
p t p t p t
+ =
+ + =
(6.5)
for all dates t for the dynamics (we deleted t in the notation to avoid confusion). 
Each value of N corresponds to a different fitness-landscape function of (b, J) 
for each N.  We can plug into equation 5.3 each pair of b and J values to obtain a partial 
derivative for each pk value.  The resulting vector of partial derivatives, (H/p1, H/p2 
… 	H/pN), multiplied by our chosen scalar step size h (we used h = 0.02), points us one 
step up the hill of H(p;b, J).  We follow this iteratively until the gradient vector 
approaches zero, at which point we have found an equilibrium fitness peak at that map 
coordinate of (b, J).  Fig. 3 shows features of the algorithm for N = 2, b = 5 and J = 1. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 3 
______________________ 
 
The choice of p(0) can matter even for a binary choice, N = 2.  Fig. 4 (after 
Lahkar and Sandholm 2008) shows, for N = 2, how the equilibrium point changes as a 
function of the initial starting value, p0, for different pairs of utility values at the same 
coordinate of b = 5 and J = 1.  Arrows show the direction of flow toward attractors and 
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away from repellors.  For Fig. 4 the utility values of the two choices were set at 0.5 and 
0.4, respectively, and the attractors in this case are 100% for either choice, such that if p1 
is greater than about 40% at time 0, it goes to the peak at 100% p1; otherwise it goes to 
the other peak at 100% p2.  The fitness value in this case, describing the highest overall 
fitness, is at 100% p1, which has the higher intrinsic utility. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 4 
______________________ 
 
When we increase to N = 3, the terrain becomes considerably more rugged, with 
basins of attraction and areas of repulsion within a space defined by (p1, p2, p3).  Fig. 5 
shows these landscapes for the selected combinations of b and J, with each set at 1, 5, or 
10.  Utilities for the three choices were fixed at U1 = 0.5, U2 = 0.4, and U3 =  0.3.  In each 
plot, the axes show the values of p1 and p2, the combination of which determines also p3 = 
1 – (p1 + p2).  Within the space, arrows point uphill toward the peak defined by the 
Lypunov gradient.  Empty spaces, or “corridors,” show areas of repulsion, with all arrows 
pointing away.  
 
______________________ 
Figure 5 
______________________ 
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 Under these parameters, the space for b = 1 and J = 1 shows one attractor at 
approximately (p1, p2, p3)  = (0.38, 0.32, 0.29).  From this situation, if we increase b to 5, 
keeping J = 1, the one attractor in the middle becomes three attractors at the corners, near 
100% p1, p2 or p3, respectively, with clear corridors of repulsion dividing their respective 
basins of attraction (Fig. 5).  Interestingly, the effect is similar when we increase J to 5, 
keeping b = 1, or increase both b and J to 5 (Fig. 5): attractors at 100% for one of the 
three choices, with clear boundaries in between.  As we increase b and J toward 10 for 
each, these three areas resolve themselves very clearly (Fig. 5). 
To explore how this transition happens, we can hold b constant and look at what 
happens when we vary the east–west coordinate, J, the strength of social influence.  
Holding b = 5 constant, as we increase J, we find some interesting developments in terms 
of both the final fitness values (Fig. 6, left) and the hill-climbing gradient H/p1 (Fig. 6, 
right). When social influence is small, J  0.1, we see a fairly sharp transition from 
positive to negative hill-climbing gradient H/p1 (Fig. 6, lower right).  When J is larger, 
1  J  2, however, we find a step transition in final fitness at lower p1, such that a small 
increase in initial p1 yields a substantial increase in final fitness (Fig. 6, upper left).
Along this discontinuity, there is also a slight slope such that a small change in social 
transparency, J, would also abruptly change the fitness, but only very close to the 
discontinuity (Fig. 6, upper left).
______________________ 
Figure 6 
______________________ 
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The sensitivity to initial p vectors shows that in order to account for potential 
multiple fitness peaks at each b, J coordinate, we need to find all equilibria, which could 
number N or fewer at each coordinate.  Hence, in order to generate a final fitness map in 
b, J space for N = 3 (Fig. 7), we need to choose a sufficient range of different starting 
vectors, p(0), to cover the space of possible p vectors and then, for each different p(0), 
follow the gradient of H/p1, H/p2 … 	H/pN to its corresponding fitness peak.  After 
checking for multiple equilibria and retaining the maximum fitness value for each, this 
algorithm is repeated for discrete choices of b and J to fill in the map in pixelated fashion 
(Fig. 7).  The computation time increases exponentially with the number of choices, N, 
which is why Fig. 7 shows the b, J map for a relatively modest value of N = 3.  Keep in 
mind this map corresponds to a specific assignment of utility values for the three different 
choices; different utility values would yield a different b, J map.  
 
______________________ 
Figure 7 
______________________ 
 
As we can see, the space of potential fitness landscapes is enormous, and further 
exploration will need to be strategic.  In one exploration we might determine the 
maximum fitness peak at each b, J coordinate for higher numbers of choices (N > 3) 
without retaining the results for “sublandscapes” of hill climbing, like those in Fig. 5, in 
finding these peaks at every b, J coordinate.  Each landscape depends on the vector of 
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utility values as well, so we would then plot a landscape in b, J space for N = 3, N = 4 and 
so on, for each specified vector of intrinsic utility values, U1, U2, …, UN.  Alternatively, 
we may also want to focus on the sublandscapes that emerge at these higher N values to 
determine whether fitness peaks appear at intermediate combinations of  (p1, p2, p3) rather 
than at the corners close to 100% for one of the choices (Fig. 5).  
 
7. Conclusion 
We applied discrete-choice theory to construct a fitness landscape over a two-
dimensional surface representing transparency of choice and social influence, 
heuristically represented as orthogonal dimensions.  In Section 3 we presented an
estimating equation (3.4) that can be parameterized and showed how the parameters 
1 2, ,    can be estimated once one has the appropriate data sets, which we discussed 
only briefly, given that actual estimation is beyond the scope of this article.  We defined a 
“transparency” function, ( , )itb z , as the inverse of the standard deviation of the random 
component of utility.  By experimenting with different specifications of the function 
( , )itb z and splitting the data set into subperiods of time, one may formulate and test 
hypotheses as to whether decision making becomes more precise, i.e., ( , )itb z  increases 
with time, or less precise, i.e., ( , )itb z  decreases over time.  Also, hypotheses can be 
formulated and tested as to whether certain observable characteristics of individual 
decision makers are associated with more or less precision in decision making. Whereas
we used linear specifications of the personal component of the utility difference, other
specifications can be made and estimated as appropriate to other hypotheses of interest.
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Finally, because the function 2( , )itJ y   can be specified, the parameter vector, 2 , can 
be estimated and used to test hypotheses involving the potential presence of social-
interaction effects.  For example, one could test the null hypothesis of zero social 
interaction effects, ( 2( , ) 0itJ y  = ).
The decision map we created has a close analogy with field studies of social 
animals.  For example, in their study of how wild olive baboons in Kenya decide how and 
where to move across the landscape, Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) use a two-
dimensional map that plots directional agreement on the vertical axis and the number of 
initiators of movement on the horizontal axis.  We view directional agreement as 
analogous to transparency, (b), and number of initiators as close to degree of social 
influence, (J). It is a convenient coincidence that Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) 
oriented their axes in the same way as ours (Fig. 1).  In addition, the observed probability 
function of a baboon following subgroup 1 rather than subgroup 2 follows a logistic 
dependence on the numerical difference between the two subgroups (Strandburg-Peshkin 
et al. 2015), which is equivalent to the right hand side of equation 3.4.  Analogous to the 
northeast corner of our map, Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) model the highest 
predictability of baboon-group movement in the space of many initiators and high 
directional agreement.  Interestingly, increasing the number of initiators (social influence) 
without increasing directional agreement (transparency) may actually decrease the 
predictability of followers in the baboon study. 
Having identified social influence and transparency of choice as two key factors 
in how decision frequencies change through time among multiple options, we have 
explored the problem of optimizing decision fitness at the population scale.  This is a 
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novel challenge because the fitness depends on both the intrinsic utilities of each choice 
as well as the transparency of social learning that benefits from relative popularity of the 
choice taken.  Using a hill-climbing algorithm, we have explored how this recursive 
relationship effects multiple equilibria, which we define as peaks on the fitness 
landscape.  Among the more surprising results is just how rugged the landscape becomes 
as one moves east on the fitness landscape, as sensitivity to social influence increases.  
The ruggedness is such that we struggle, even through computational methods, to define 
the fitness landscape for even N = 4 different options.  
About a decade ago, a social-psychology experiment showed how the popularity 
of decisions among many similar options becomes less predictable as those decisions are 
made visible (Salganik et al. 2006).  The subjects were choosing among N = 48 online 
music tracks, whose popularity was either visible or invisible.  Besides having an order of 
magnitude more choices than the fitness landscapes we have explored, the social utility of 
each song was probably not directly proportional to its popularity, due to diminishing 
returns.  In future work we could incorporate diminishing returns from growing 
popularity in the social portion of our fitness function.  In other cases, however, the social 
fitness we used here may be appropriate, where popularity does contribute more or less 
directly to overall fitness.  In the world of humans, obvious candidates include financial 
investments or a communication or entertainment technology whose utility grows with 
more users.  In animal culture we might see this be the case, as in chimpanzee tool 
culture, with our model implying that social learning among even a few or several 
different options could bring about a rugged fitness landscape and hence multiple regions 
of different cultural traditions (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999).  For these reasons, we see value 
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in continuing to explore fitness landscapes of discrete choice with social influence.   
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Consider the expression 
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Note that when  goes to zero in (A.1), one gets the limiting form .  Apply 
L’Hospital’s Rule of basic calculus and differentiate both the numerator and the 
denominator of (A.1) with respect to  to obtain 
(A.2)
This proves the first line of (4.5). For the second line, suppose without loss of generality, 
that .  Then, 
(A.3)
because .  This proves the second line of (4.7). 
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Figures  
 
Fig. 1.  A four-quadrant map for understanding different domains of human decision 
making, based on whether a decision is made individually or socially (horizontal axis) 
and the transparency of options and payoffs that inform a decision (vertical axis) (after 
Bentley et al., 2014). 
 
Fig. 2.  Map comparing nonlinear least-squares estimates (blue dots) against simulations 
(red dots) of the model defined by equation 2.0 (after Brock et al. 2014, fig. 4).  The 
simulated data for variables xi1gt, xi0gt, yigt , and zigt were each independently chosen from 
values normally distributed through time t with mean 10, with the variance for the 
payoffs xi1gt and xi0gt set at 0.01 and the variance for yigt and for zigt set at 1.  For individual 
i in group g at time t, the payoff difference between options 1 and 0 is represented by xi1gt 
- xi0gt, the presence of social influence is measured by yigt, and zigt represents how variable 
the choices were through time.  As described by Brock et al. (2014), estimating the 
parameter vector , along with the scalar observable z, determines the transparency of 
choice, b(.), and estimating the parameter vector, 2, specifies the social-influence 
function, J(.). Each simulation used 30 time steps, 100 groups, and 200 agents per group 
and noise component i1gt - i0gt, with mean 0 and  = 0.1.  
 
Fig. 3.  Illustration of hill-climbing process for N = 2 choices, of U1 = 0.511 and U2 = 
0.489, respectively, at a specific map coordinate, b = 5 and J = 1.  Among the four plots, 
the top row shows how the Lypunov algorithm converges on p1 and on F over the t time 
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steps, and the bottom left shows p1/dt against p1.  The bottom right shows the 
equilibrium probability at the end of the hill-climbing algorithm.  In this example, the 
fitness was maximized through 100% choice 2. 
 
Fig. 4.  A vector figure for N = 2, b = 5, and J = 1, with utility values U1 = 0.5 and U2 = 
0.4.  The line represents p1 + p2 = 1, along which each initial p1(0) shows arrows that 
point at that line in the direction of dp1/dt starting at p1(0).  Each arrow has a length 
proportional to the size of dp1/dt.  Note that dp2/dt = –dp1/dt.   
 
Fig. 5.  Plots for N = 3, with utility values U1 = 0.5, U2 = 0.4 and U3 = 0.3.  The nine 
plots in the grid show three different values for both b and J.  For plots on the left, the 
vertical axis shows final fitness, F; plots on the right show hill-climbing gradient H/p1. 
 
Fig. 6.  Image plots for N = 3, with b = 5, where p1 is varied but we set p3 = 3p2; that is, p2 
= (1–p1)/4 and p3 =
  3(1–p1)/4.  In the plots on the left, the colors show the final fitness 
values, with numbers next to “+” symbols showing the value along selected contours.  On
the right, colors and contour values indicate the hill-climbing gradient H/p1.  In the 
lower right, where J  0.1, note the fairly sharp transition from positive to negative hill-
climbing gradient H/p1. In the upper right, where 1  J  2, note the step transition in 
final fitness at lower p1, such that a small increase in initial p1 would yield a substantial 
increase in final fitness.
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Fig. 7.  Contour plot of the b, J map showing the maximum fitness for N = 3.  To find 
these maximum fitness values, the hill-climbing process was followed at b, J coordinate.  
At each coordinate, multiple hill-climbing searches were made over a range of initial 
probability vectors for the three choices: p1(0), p2(0) and p3(0).  The maximum fitness 
was then retained at each b, J coordinate. 
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1.  Introduction 
Whether in the world of humans or other social animals, the evolution of behavior 
involves decisions made in the context of other agents. When agents are faced with 
making decisions involving multiple options, they can do one of two things. They can 
either learn individually, where they attempt to think things through by themselves, or 
they can learn socially by using other agents as sources of information. We can think of 
the former as information producers and the latter as information scroungers (Mesoudi 
2008). The question is how to estimate the balance and accuracy of these processes from 
observational data and then to assess how those factors affect fitness. This paper 
represents another step toward the ultimate goal of estimating a fitness-landscape 
function over the map of decision making of Bentley et al. (2014) by using panel data 
sets in which social interactions are present.  As we explain in section 3, the map has two 
axes—a north–south axis reflecting “transparency” in decision making, where 
transparency increases as one moves northward, and an east–west axis of social influence 
in decision making, where social influence increases as one moves eastward. 
Progress toward that goal was made in Brock et al. (2014), in which we adapted 
econometric and statistical work on multinomial logit models (Amemiya, 1985, chap. 9; 
Anderson et al., 1992; Greene, 2003, chap. 21) to estimate discrete-choice models with 
variable intensity of choice—our measure of transparency—and variable social-
interaction strength.  Here we extend that work by formulating a precise concept of 
fitness function that can be estimated.  To do this, we focus on multiple equilibria, which 
Brock et al. (2014) did not cover, and sketch an approach to estimation of the fitness 
landscape in the presence of multiple equilibria. Brock et al. (2014) also did not discuss 
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plausible dynamics, in the spirit of Samuelson’s (1941, 1947) correspondence principle.  
Samuelson argued that equilibrium would never be observed in the field if it were not 
stable with respect to a plausible dynamic out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.  We 
propose such an adjustment to pick out particular members of the set of multiple 
equilibria that appear when social interactions are strong enough.  We argue that unstable 
equilibria are not likely to be observed and that estimation should proceed in the presence 
of stable multiple equilibria and ignore unstable multiple equilibria.    
To place our study in a broader context, we summarize below some of the recent 
work that has been done in the area of cultural learning, given that it forms the foundation 
of the horizontal axis of our map.  We stress that the studies we mention do not deal with 
the actual estimation of fitness functions, nor do they deal with the particular concept of 
fitness function that we have borrowed from the discrete-choice econometric and 
statistical literature.  Finally, they do not deal with the computation of equilibria or 
provide a theory of which equilibria are likely to be observed when actual estimation is 
conducted in the presence of multiple equilibria.  Addressing these issues represents our 
contribution, and we believe a wide audience will find our approach to the formulation of 
fitness functions and their estimation to be useful.  Readers might note that in our brief 
review we use words and phrases such as “transparency,” “social conformity,” and 
“social interactions,” which are subject to the imprecision of words in contrast to the 
precision of the mathematical concepts of “transparency” and “social conformity” that we 
develop later in a context amenable to estimation techniques from econometrics and 
statistics. 
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2.  Social influence: a key element in decision making 
Within any population, the precise mixture of individual, or independent (asocial), 
learners versus social learners—a dichotomy sometimes referred to as information 
“producers” versus information “scroungers” (Mesoudi, 2008; Rendell et al., 2011)—
may be crucial to a group’s ability to climb a rugged fitness landscape (Rogers, 1995; 
Mesoudi and Whiten, 2008; Rendell et al., 2010; O’Brien et al., 2015).  The reason for 
this is that while social learning spreads behaviors, it depends on individual learning to 
generate them in the first place.  The question is, when should an agent do one as 
opposed to the other, and how does the shift affect fitness?  Or, more precisely, how does 
an agent integrate social and individual learning (Perreault et al., 2012)?  Several studies 
have examined this question (e.g., Giraldeau et al., 2002; Kendal et al., 2009), many 
building on Rogers’ (1988) earlier modeling.  Rogers proposed that environmental 
change lowers the fitness of a group comprising individual and social learners because 
the latter cannot track new changes in the environment and thus will copy outdated 
information from each other (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2011; Rieucau and 
Giraldeau, 2011).  If the environment does not change, group fitness increases because 
social learners are adopting optimal behaviors, and it costs less to scrounge than to 
produce, unless producers charge a price for copying.  Similarly, Perreault et al. (2012) 
found that natural selection favors agents who place heavy weight on social cues when 
the environment changes slowly or when its state cannot be well predicted using 
individual learning. 
There should exist in a population an optimally adaptive mix of the two learning 
strategies, but that does not insure that this optimal mix will occur, as other steady-state 
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mixes might exist.  Numerous studies suggest that about 5% of informed individuals are 
enough to guide a social group (e.g., schooling fish) to a destination (Dyer et al., 2009; 
Herbert-Read et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013; Kurvers et al., 2014).  Among that minority, 
this “pied piper” effect is augmented by intensity of direction (Couzin et al., 2011), which 
we might generalize as the “intensity of choice” (Bentley et al., 2014), or the 
accumulation of knowledge (Gomes, 2006). 
More generally, the benefits of social learning are substantial enough for it to 
have been a key factor in human evolution (Hruschka, 2010; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013; 
Christakis and Fowler, 2014).  Small groups can outperform even the most 
skilled/knowledgeable individual on complex tasks (Woolley et al., 2010) and in 
remembering information (Clément et al., 2013).  In traditional societies, social learning 
is usually transparent, as experts in different essential categories of adaptive knowledge 
(medicinal plants, hunting, fishing, cultivation) are well known to the group members 
(Henrich and Broesch, 2011).  Over generations, well-directed social learning increases 
collective knowledge—teachers to students, parents to children, experts to general 
communities. 
Recent experiments (e.g., Salganik et al., 2006; Lorenz et al., 2011) show that 
providing information about what others are doing—downloading music, estimating 
quantities on survey questions—yields herding behavior that reduces the diversity of 
independent judgments within trials but increases variance between trials, thereby 
reducing the accuracy of the aggregated mean of those judgments.  If misinformation 
invades the social-learning process, false alarms can spread (Couzin et al., 2005).  As 
information spreads between, say, Facebook or Twitter friends (Aral et al., 2009; Bond et 
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al., 2012; Garcia-Herranz et al., 2014), expertise is not necessarily transparent to all 
members of the networks.  In cases where expertise is not transparent, a good strategy 
might be to copy recent success (Laland, 2004).  A social-learning tournament hosted by 
St Andrews University in 2009 showed that when success is transparent, it can be enough 
just to know what learned behaviors have recently been successful (Rendell et al., 2010).  
Schools and flocks may be seen as “copying the recent”: When flocking agents are 
copying their neighbors’ current direction of travel, the information is available 
practically instantaneously (Couzin et al., 2005). 
Debate exists, however, over whether it is possible to demonstrate social learning 
with observational data without resorting to strong a priori assumptions (Shalizi and 
Thomas, 2011; Thomas, 2013; Hobaiter et al., 2014).  In other words, how do we 
distinguish between genuine social influence and individual discovery?  The “three-
degrees-of-influence” hypothesis concerning behaviors that spread within human social 
networks beyond one’s immediate friends (Christakis and Fowler 2013) can also be 
explained by simple autocorrelation through individual discovery combined with 
homophily—the tendency for individuals with similar traits to co-associate (Brock and 
Durlauf, 2001; Aral et al., 2009; Thomas, 2013).  We return to the issue of homophily 
later. 
 
3.  A bi-directional map of decision making  
There are two important factors, or “dimensions,” in terms of how decisions are 
made in the face of multiple options: the magnitude of social influence in the learning 
process and the transparency of costs and payoffs to either social learning or individual 
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learning.  These two dimensions, together with how they change over time, are the 
essence of discrete-choice theory with social influence (Brock and Durlauf 2001; Brock 
et al. 2014).  This led us to propose a theoretical framework grounded in a bi-axial map 
that extracts, from observational data, the transparency of decisions and the extent to 
which a behavior is acquired socially versus individually (Fig. 1) (Bentley and O’Brien, 
2011; Bentley, Earls, and O’Brien, 2011; Bentley, O’Brien, and Ormerod, 2011; Bentley 
et al., 2014; Bentley and O’Brien, 2015).  The horizontal axis represents the learning 
continuum, as we aim to identify popularity-data signatures that distinguish individually 
motivated actions from those driven by social influence.  The vertical axis captures how 
transparent the payoffs of actions and/or their role models are.  The map is integrative: 
unbiased copying, for example, maps into the southeast quadrant, rational choice in the 
northwest, and well-informed social learning (e.g., from high-ranking individuals or 
renowned experts, i.e., prestige bias [Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Atkisson et al., 
2012]) in the northeast.  The map attempts to link the population-level temporal dynamics 
of behavior frequencies to the acquisition of social/environmental information that 
underlies agents’ decisions. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 1 
______________________ 
 
In resolving both axes simultaneously, the map calls for traditional and novel 
forms of time-series analysis of the form and dynamics of popularity distributions cross-
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referenced with studies from individuals and populations (Brock et al., 2014).  We have 
parameterized the functions that underlie the map so that we can estimate paths through 
it.  The vertical axis, which we parameterize as bt, represents the transparency of an 
individual’s decision and its consequences—costs and payoffs—from absolute 
transparency along the northern edge (bt = ) to complete opaqueness along the southern 
edge (bt = 0).  The horizontal axis, measured by parameter Jt, represents the extent to 
which a decision is made, from purely individually at the western edge (Jt = 0) to purely 
social decision making, or copying, at the eastern edge (Jt = ).  This allows a 
parameterization in terms of how probability, Pk, of choice k (versus null-choice 
probability, P0) depends on transparency of choice and social influence.  Here the null 
choice, zero, is introduced to allow a choice made outside the set of options 1,2,…,N to 
serve as a useful baseline option.  It is also useful in tidying up notation when writing 
log-odds regression equations in discrete-choice estimation theory. 
We follow Anderson et al. (1992, chap. 2, especially app. 2.10.4) in developing 
the relatively standard background from discrete-choice theory that eventually leads to 
the estimation equation discussed later (see also Greene [2003] and especially Amemiya 
[1985, chap. 9]).  At each date t assume there are i = 1,2,…,I persons making choices 
from a set {0,1,2,…,N} of choices.  An individual, i, is assumed to face N primary 
choices of interest plus another choice, denoted by zero.  We assume the payoff of any 
given choice k to person i at date t consists of a deterministic term, ( , )tU i k , and a 
random term,   t (i,k) .  We assume the latter is distributed identically and independently 
across people, choices, and dates.  We also add the restriction used by Anderson et al. 
(1992, eqs. 2.30 and 2A.6) that the distribution of the random term is a double-
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exponential distribution with shape parameter t .  Note that t is allowed to change over 
time.  Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.30) show that if there are no social effects, i.e., 
2( , ) 0itJ y = , the probability that person i chooses choice k at date t is given by
Pt (i,k) =
1
Zt
e(1/t )Ut ( i,k ) ,k = 0,1,2,..., N
Zt  e(1/t )Ut ( i, j )
j=1
N ,t = 1,2,...,T .
(3.1)
It is common to denote 1/t tb   and call it the “intensity of choice.”  Anderson 
et al. (1992, eq. 2A.13) show that variance in the decision making of person i is 
proportional to 2t .  We therefore define our transparency measure as bt.  The motivation 
for defining transparency in this manner is that the larger bt is, the smaller the variance in 
decision making across the alternatives.   As we point out in more detail elsewhere 
(Bentley et al., 2014), the intensity of choice, bt, is a precise and useful way to model the 
concept of transparency at each date t, where (1) bt = 0 corresponds to the lowest level of 
transparency—noise in choice is so large that choice is completely random over the 
choice set; and (2) bt =  corresponds to the highest level of transparency—the relative 
values of payoffs of each choice are so high that there is no doubt as to which choice 
yields the highest payoff.
The question might be asked whether the intensity-of-choice measure, tb , from 
discrete-choice theory is a useful measure to an econometrician or statistician who is 
trying to use observational data on a set of decision makers to estimate and measure 
“transparency.”  Anderson et al. (1992, chap. 2) present an excellent discussion of this 
question.  As they point out, the origins of discrete-choice theory emerged from attempts 
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to model a single decision maker whose state of mind is randomly changing, and the 
theory came to be called the random utility model.  Randomness could arise from many 
causes, ranging from incomplete understanding of the values of the various options, to 
learning about the values of the various options, to inherent changes in the values of the 
options to the decision maker.  If none of this randomness were present in the mind of the 
decision maker, he or she would simply rank the options and choose the best one.  This is 
the polar case of infinite intensity of choice, tb = .
The opposite polar case is that of completely random choice due to reasons such as 
total ignorance about the values of the individual choice options, e.g., 0tb = , where each 
option is chosen with the same probability.  Anderson et al. (1992), quoting Manski (1977), 
list another interpretation of the discrete choice model: uncertainty is a result of the lack of 
information available to the modeler.  This could be due to nonobservable characteristics, 
nonobservable variations in individual utilities, measurement errors, and functional 
misspecifications.  Fortunately, “the two approaches lead to the same choice probabilities” 
(Anderson et al. 1992, p. 33).  For this reason we have decided to use the intensity-of-
choice measure, tb , as our measure of “transparency.”  When we use the word 
“transparency,” we are referring to tb  and will specify a functional form for tb  as a 
function of a parameter vector and observable characteristics.  We do not claim that this is 
the most useful definition of “transparency” in all contexts; rather, we claim that it enables 
us to make quantitative progress in some contexts. 
Returning to equation (3.1), note that it can be written in the equivalent log-odds 
form as 
 11
ln
Pt (i,k)
Pt (i,0)



	 =
1
t



	 Ut (i,k)Ut (i,0)]= bt[Ut (i,k)Ut (i,0) 
 , (3.2)
which is handier for estimation purposes.  We now extend this development to include 
social effects, which we can include by replacing ( , )tU i k  with 
Vt (i,k) =Ut (i,k)+ Jt Pt (k), (3.3)
where ( )tP k  denotes the fraction of the community that chooses choice k at date t.
Suppose one has a set of characteristics of the N + 1 different available choices at 
dates t = 1,2,…,T, denoted by {xijt ,i = 1,2,..., I , j = 0,1,2,..., N ,t = 1,2,...,T}.  Suppose also 
that one has a data set on individuals, i = 1,2,…,I that consists of variables that may 
impact the variance of decision making at each date, denoted by 
{ , 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., }itz i I t T= = .  Finally, suppose that one has a set of variables,
{yit ,i = 1,2,..., I ,t = 1,2,...,T}, that should enter the function J (2 , yit ) .  Note that that 
function parameterizes the social influence on choices made by individual i.  We also 
assume for estimation purposes that we have data on the average choice fractions,
( ), 0,1,2,...,tP j j N= , made by the community.  Given these data, we write the estimating 
equation from Brock et al. (2014, eq. 5) that is appropriate for implementation by non-
linear least squares (NLLS), as
( ){ }1 0 2( , )ln ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) (0) ,( ,0)
t
it ikt i t it t t
t
P i k b z x x J y P k P
P i
    =  +   	
             (3.4) 
where 1 2( , , )   is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 
1 0( , ) ( ,0) ( )t t ikt i tU i k U i x x =  .
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Recall that the characteristic iktx  is a scalar here.  It is easy to generalize the treatment of 
characteristics to the case where they are vectors. 
Here we repeat that our estimating equation is motivated by the underlying theory 
from, for example, equations (3.2) and (3.3).  Brock et al. (2014) developed this 
framework and showed how estimation of the parameter vector ( ,1,2 )  can be done in 
practice by trying it out on simulated data, but they did not address conceptualizing and 
estimating a useful specification of fitness function or how to deal with multiple 
equilibria.  We take up these issues below, after briefly discussing potential biases we 
face in conducting estimation procedures using field data. 
Once we have estimates of the parameter vector, ( ,1,2 ) —denote these 
estimates as 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , )   —we may insert them into the social surplus function, ( )S V , of 
Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.37), which we slightly modify in equation (3.5) 
( / )
0 0
1
( ; , ) ln (1/ ( 1)) ln (1/ ( 1)) ,k k
N N
V bV
k k
F p b J N e N e
b

= =
    = + = + 	    
                (3.5) 
to obtain an estimate tˆF .  This object is our estimated fitness function.  It can change over 
time because although the estimate of the parameter vector 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , )    does not change, 
the vector of covariates can.  In this way, we not only obtain an estimate of a path 
0
ˆ ˆ{ ( , ), ( , )}Tit it tb z J y  =  but also an estimate tˆF  over time for fitness along the estimated 
path 0ˆ ˆ{ ( , ), ( , )}
T
it it tb z J y  = in the floor of our map of decision making.  We discuss this in 
more detail below. 
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The parameterization of tJ  by the function Jt = J (2 , yit )  is for estimation 
purposes. Regarding the social-learning dimension, J, we assume that social utility is 
positively influenced by relative popularity, by letting J   0 denote the strength of social 
influence on decision making.  Although for specificity we will emphasize the case of 
positive association with relative popularity, note that in equation (3.4) J (2 , yit )  could 
be negative, which might represent anticonformity, for example. 
Our goal has been to extract these dimensions from observational data.  Using 
simulated data, we showed in an earlier paper (Brock et al., 2014) how functions 
representing bt and Jt could be specified in terms of data and a vector of parameters and 
how these parameters could be estimated by NLLS.  We generated noisy random values 
of “real” variables x, y, and z and used NLLS and our parameterization above to see how 
well we could recover the dimensions b (north–south) and J (east–west).  In Fig. 2, the 
red dots are simulated data, and the blue dots are our estimates.  One can see that the 
largest discrepancies between model and data lie in the north–south dimension.  This is 
because the expected value of the optimal decision, made over N possible choices, needs 
to be computed for a given set of parameters of the payoffs to the decision makers.  The 
problem lies in the multiple equilibria that appear as social influence becomes strong in 
an environment where there are many possible choices. 
  
______________________ 
Figure 2 
______________________ 
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Here we show how to compute the expected value of the optimal decision as a 
function of the basic parameters of the environment for deciding among N possible 
choices.  Our objective is to estimate the functions b(.) and J(.) simultaneously (Brock et 
al., 2014), and we need to be aware of the difficulties in distinguishing between 
homophily and social causation.  As far as we know, Goldbaum and Mizrach (2008) are 
the only ones to estimate the function (.)b  as a function of observable covariates.  
However, they did not discuss estimation of social influence and potential biases caused 
by selection bias and correlated unobservables or estimation of a fitness function.  In fact, 
estimates of the function J(.) may be picking up any kind of “social” correlation.  It is 
important to realize that more research is needed on methods to remove this kind of bias in 
estimations of (.), (.)b J  and that these biases will cause biases in the estimation of the 
corresponding fitness function tˆF .  Some limited progress was made by Brock and 
Durlauf (2006) in correcting for selection bias in estimates of (.)J caused by similar 
agents choosing to be members of the same reference group, but their method does not 
correct for all bias that might appear in estimates of (.)b .  Detailed development of 
methods to correct estimates of (.), (.)b J  for biases of the type mentioned above is beyond 
the scope of this article, but it is important to at least briefly mention the problem, given 
the confusion and controversy it has caused in the literature (e.g., Shalizi and Thomas 
2010; Thomas 2013). 
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4.  Optimal decisions among many options under social influence 
Samuelson (1941, 1947) argued in his correspondence principle that an 
equilibrium would not be observed in a field setting unless it were stable with respect to a 
plausible out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.  This notion has been debated since and 
is being debated today (e.g., Echenique 2008).  The main point of contention is over what 
should serve as a plausible out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.  We formulate a 
process below that seems to make sense.  For ease of presentation, we change the 
notation slightly by deleting the person index, i, and the date index, t.  We will also think 
of the out-of-equilibrium adjustment dynamics as occurring on a faster time scale than 
the time scale of change in the observable variables that drive changes in the intensity of 
choice and social influence.  Looking ahead, we argue that unstable equilibria with 
respect to our out-of-equilibrium adjustment process are unlikely to appear in any 
observational data set.  This is the reason why it is worthwhile to spend time below 
exploring properties of the adjustment process.  Finally, we note that it is notationally 
more convenient to drop the “baseline” choice labeled zero and work with choices 
labeled 1,2,...,k N= .
Consider an environment consisting of N possible decisions, each with payoff 
Uk, k = 1, 2,…, N.  As previously, we let b  0 denote the transparency of the payoff 
values of the decisions.  With zero transparency (b = 0), decision makers have zero 
confidence in their evaluation of payoffs, so they select choice k = 1, 2, …N with 
probability 1/N, i.e., completely randomly.  With complete transparency, b —> , agents 
can choose the highest payoff option with probability one.   
 16
In the discrete-choice literature, the utility of different choices consists of a 
deterministic utility, ktU , plus an element of randomness, t  kt , as 
 
Ukt =Ukt + t  kt ,k = 1,2,..., N ,t = 1,2,...,T                           (4.1)   
Here we have placed subscripts to indicate that when discussing estimation we allow the 
utilities as well as the parameter t  to change over time.  In instances where we are 
simply explaining the basics of discrete-choice theory, we drop the date subscript to 
reduce notation. 
The deterministic part of each payoff, Uk, can be ranked as U1 > U2 > … > UN, 
such that, without loss of generality, when X is small, most choices will be clustered 
around choice number 1.  As X becomes large, the choice probabilities spread out across 
the N choices, approaching a uniform distribution as X becomes very large.  Because our 
intensity-of-choice function, b(.), is inversely related to X, the farther north we go on the 
map, the more tightly the distribution of choices clusters around the maximum 
deterministic payoff.  This is what motivates our estimation of the b(.) as a function of 
observable covariates (Brock et al., 2014). 
As previously, the deterministic component of utility when social effects are 
present is given by 
Vk =Uk + Jpk , k = 1,2,..., N . (4.2)  
Actual utility of choice, k, is random and consists of the deterministic component, kV ,
and a random component,  k , that is distributed double exponentially with scale 
parameter  . The random component is distributed independently and identically across 
choices.  As Anderson et al (1992, p. 60) show, this implies that the pairwise difference 
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of the random components is distributed logistically with zero mean and variance,
2 2 2 / 6  = .  Hence, we write the random utility as 
 
Vk =Vk +  k , k = 1,2,..., N . (4.3)  
 An important and standard quantity from discrete choice theory (Anderson et al 
1992, pp. 60–61), which we shall use later, is the expectation of the maximum of the 
random utilities across choices, 
 
E{max k{1,2,...,N } Vk}= S(V ) =  ln e(Vk / )
k=1
N


= 1
b


	

 ln e
bVk
k=1
N


,          (4.4) 
where 1/b  .  The quantity ( )S V  can be thought of as a welfare measure for an 
individual facing this particular choice environment. 
Our preliminary goal is to show how ((b(.), J(.)) in a population of agents facing 
N possible choices determines the fitness of the optimal decision in the population.  For 
such a population, the maximum payoff for each fixed value of ((b(.), J(.)) is the expected 
value of the optimal decision, i.e., the “fitness function.”  This is a novel problem because 
the optimal decision depends not only on intrinsic utility, Uk, but also on transparency, b, 
and social learning, J, as well as on the relative popularity, pk, of each of the N possible 
choices.  This recursive relationship means that multiple equilibria can exist and that the 
fitness function may also change over time as ((b(.), J(.)) changes.  
To keep things simple to start, we fix the values of b and J.  We can think of (b, 
J) as changing on a slower time scale than the faster dynamics that give rise to the 
optimal decision.  By assuming that (b, J) are constant over this faster time scale, we will 
introduce an algorithm that computes equilibria as well as points on our fitness landscape.  
Even with fixed b and J, we still face the problem of multiple equilibria, so we start by 
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computing equilibrium solutions for the extreme values (zero and infinity) of b and J.  
Then, when there are multiple equilibria, we argue that certain “natural” equilibria will be 
unique for each pair of b and J.   
We start with the multinomial logit framework for the general case of N choices 
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001), in which the probability of choice k (from 1 to N) is given by 
pk =
1
ebUi+bJpi
i=1
N e
bUk+bJpk , k = 1,2,..., N ,                             (4.5) 
where k = 1, 2,…N indexes the N different choices.  It is a fixed-point equation because 
we must find a vector ( p1, p2 ,..., pN )  of probabilities that simultaneously satisfies both 
sides of equation (4.5) for k = 1,2,…, N.  We have explained how the choice probabilities 
given in equation (4.5) are derived from the random utilities (Anderson et al., 1992, eq. 
2.30).  Recall that  is the shape parameter of the double-exponential distribution 
function (Anderson et al., 1992, eq. 2A.6) and that 1/b   by definition. We add an 
extra term to the usual expected value of the optimal decision, ( )S V  (Anderson et al., 
1992, eq. 2.37), in order to build the fitness function that we want to compute.  Our 
fitness function is given by  
 
F( p;b, J )  E{max i{1,2,...,N } Vk}+ 1b ln
1
N




 = S(V )+
1
b
ln
1
N





= 1
b
ln
1
N
ebUk+bJpk
k=1
N	


.
(4.6) 
As an interim measure of “fitness” in equation (4.6), we have taken the standard discrete-
choice measure of welfare, ( )S V , and added the term 1
b
ln
1
N



 . Note that this does not 
change the partial derivatives with respect to Uk or pk for k = 1, 2,…, N.  Here, 
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.  If we knew how to compute a “natural” choice of equilibrium vector, 
call it , to solve the N equations (4.5), we could define our fitness-landscape 
function as .  We will develop what we mean by a “natural” 
equilibrium in Section 5.
 This modification of adding the constant term 
1
b
ln
1
N



  to the formula for the 
term 
 
E{max i{1,2,...,N } Vk}  in Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.37) turns out to have some useful 
properties.  One is that we can address the problem of multiple equilibria first by 
computing equilibrium solutions for the extreme values b = 0, and J = 0,.  For J = 0, 
the solution of (4.5) is unique.  Further, for , 
 
b 0,  implies, F( p;b,0) ( 1
N
) Uk
k=1
N
b, implies, F( p;b,0)max{Uk} .                                    
(4.7) 
 
(See Appendix 1 for a short proof of 4.7.) Suppose one plots the “fitness function” (4.6) 
on the vertical axis and plots (b, J) on the horizontal axis of a graphical display of a 
“fitness landscape.”  We can see right away from our results (4.7) that if one draws the 
peaks for the far west side of the map, where J = 0, one will see the height of the peak 
rising as b increases.  For J = 0, the height will rise from the average payoff at the far 
south, i.e., where b = 0, to the maximum of the payoffs as one heads north. 
For finite J > 0, writing pk(b) to emphasize the dependence of pk on the value of 
b, we have  
p  ( p1,..., pN )
*( , )p b J
W (b, J )  F( p *(b, J );b, J )
0J =
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1
0,  ,  ( ; , ) (1/ ) ( (0))
(0) 1/ , 1,2,...,
,  ,  ( ; ,0) max{ ( )}
( ) 1
N
k k
k
k
k k
k
b implies F p b J N U Jp
p N k N
b implies F p b U Jp
p
=
  +
= =
  + 
 =

                       (4.8)   
Suppose we rank the deterministic payoffs as mentioned above, with U1 > U2 > … > UN, 
and U1 as the maximum payoff.  We have already seen for the case J = 0 that one can 
prove that p1 —> 1 as b —> .  However, for 0 < b < , the next result shows that 
multiple equilibria will appear when J becomes large enough.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
one can show that when J —> , for any choice k, there is an equilibrium where the 
probability that k is chosen is one.  This is because we are restricting ourselves to settings 
where the social utility of a choice correlates positively with its popularity (we recognize 
there will be many settings where this is not the case).  As choice k becomes more 
popular, the social payoff (4.2) rises to the point where it surpasses the intrinsic part of 
the payoff and an agent can simply conform to the majority choice of the community 
(McElreath et al., 2008). 
To summarize, we see that for J —> , the equilibria, i.e., limiting fixed points, 
in (4.5) occur at pk = 1, and all other probabilities zero, for k = 1, 2, …, N.  If Uk = Uj = 0, 
then for J —> , the equilibria of (4.5) occur with pk = ½, pj = ½ for every pair k  j.  If 
Uk = Uj = Ul = 0, then for J —> , pk = 1/3, pj = 1/3, pl = 1/3 for every triplet k  j  l, and 
so on for all possible mixed-strategy equilibria.  Parenthetically, it might be argued that a 
discussion of limiting behavior and multiple equilibria, including mixed-strategy 
equilibria, is extraneous to the main goal of estimation of intensity of choice, social 
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influence, and fitness function, but we believe that it is important to have a solid 
understanding of the theory that lies behind the objects that one is trying to estimate.  
 
5.  The fitness landscape over multiple equilibria 
For large values of the social-learning parameter, J, there can be a plethora of 
equilibria.  We need to evaluate the fitness function F(p;b,J) at each of these equilibria in 
order to complete the fitness landscape discussed in Section 4.  We can start with small 
values of N = 2, 3, 4,… and then evaluate F(p;b,J) at each one of these equilibria in order 
to show the height of the fitness landscape at each value of (b, J).  We start with the case 
of N = 2, where we can compute the equilibria as 0b >  and 0J   vary by plotting a 
graph and using the constraint p1 + p2 = 1.  For N = 3 we can use p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 to 
reduce the problem to solving two equations in two unknowns, (p1,  p2), for each value of 
the vector (b, J), and in the general case we solve the equations below, where we have 
added a set of differential equations whose steady states are equilibria: 
1
1
/ ( ; , ),  0,  1,2,...,
1
/ ( ; , ) ,  1,2,...,
j jk k
N
bU bJpbU bJp
k k k
j
N
k
k
k k k
p e e f p b J p k N
p
dp dt f p b J p k N
++
=
=
=   =
=
=  =


(5.1)
 
 
Given that multiple equilibria may appear for b > 0 as J —> , where the 
fitness function itself may not be well defined or have infinite limit, which equilibrium 
should we use for the value of ( ; , )F p b J ?  We face the task of computing all the 
equilibria for each 0, 0b J>   and possibly picking the one that gives the largest value 
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of ( *( , ), , )F p b J b J .  However, we argue below that a better option is to specify a 
plausible out-of-equilibrium dynamic process in the form of a set of differential 
equations, i.e., a dynamical system whose steady states are equilibria (solutions of 
equations such as 5.1 for the general case of N  choices), and to simulate the dynamical 
system to identify equilibria that are local attractors for the dynamical system (5.1).  We 
labeled steady states that satisfy this local stability property “natural” equilibrium points.  
The motivation for this choice is that an “unnatural” equilibrium is unlikely to be 
observed, as was argued by Samuelson (1941, 1947).   
For this exploration, we make use of a Lyapunov function. The specific choice 
of Lyapunov function is not so important, as long as its gradient, where zero, yields a 
solution to equations 4.5 and 5.1.  We propose the following as our Lyapunov function:  
 H ( p;b, J )  F( p;b, J ) J
2
pk
2
k=1
N .                             (5.2)  
 
We claim that the partial derivatives of H  with respect to , 1,2,...,kp k N=  are all zero 
on equilibria and that L(p;b,J)  –H(p;b,J) acts like a Lyapunov function for the 
dynamical system, 
 
dpk
dt
= Hpk
= J e
bUk+bJpk
ebU j+bJp j
j=1
N
 pk




	

.
                             (5.3)
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Notice that this dynamical system is the same as the one in (5.1) except for the constant 
J , which does nothing but change the “speed” of the dynamics provided that 0J > , 
which we assume to be the case from this point on.  This system is essentially the same as 
the one in (5.1), except for the units of “time,” and is what we will use as our out-of-
equilibrium adjustment process in order to implement Samuelson’s (1941, 1947) 
correspondence principle.  We chose (5.3) because, as we will see, it has very nice 
mathematical properties and is, hence, quite easy to analyze.   
The dynamical system is a “gradient dynamical system,” that is, the right side of 
(5.3) is the gradient of a scalar function H(p;b,J).  It yields a handy “pseudo-Lyapunov” 
function, ( ; , ) ( ; , )L p b J H p b J=  .  We call L a “pseudo-Lyapunov” function because it 
does not satisfy the usual definiteness conditions for a Lyapunov function; however, it is 
still useful for computing equilibria.   
Intuitively, the dynamical system (5.3) “climbs” the function H(p;b,J) because it 
moves in the direction of the gradient vector ( ; , ) /H p b J p  .  Hence, we expect the 
system to stop climbing and come to rest on local maxima of the function, H(p;b,J).  We 
call these equilibria of (5.1), which are local maxima of H(p;b,J), “natural equilibria.”  
Samuelson’s correspondence principle demands that an equilibrium be “natural,” i.e., that 
it have a nonzero basin of attraction with respect to an out-of-equilibrium dynamical 
adjustment process, which we take to be the system (5.3).  The system will converge to 
that equilibrium if it starts near enough (in terms of that equilibrium).  The proof is 
simple, so we give it here.  We must show for  L(p;b,J)  –H(p;b,J) that / 0dV dt <  on 
solutions of (5.3) and is zero on solutions of (4.5), i.e., is zero on the set of equilibria.  Or, 
 24
to put it another way, it is zero on steady-state solutions of the differential equations 
(5.1). We have from (5.3) and the definition of L , 
2
1 1
/ / ( / )( / ) ( / ) 0
N N
k k k
k k
dL dt dH dt H p dp dt H p
= =
=  =    =    <  (5.4)  
 
Hence, 
dL
dt
= 0 iff Hpk
= 0,k = 1,2,...N .                                           (5.5)   
 
Note that the equilibrium that makes the function ( ; , )F p b J largest on the set of 
equilibria, call it *( , )p b J , may not be found by the process (5.3) because  *( , )p b J  
may not be a steady state of local attraction for the process (5.3), i.e., it is unstable with 
respect to the process (5.3).  We exclude such equilibria for the “Samuelsonian” reasons 
given above.  Recall equation (4.4), where we let **( , )p b J  denote the equilibrium that 
gives the largest value of F(p;b,J) over the set of natural equilibria. 
The function ( **( , ); , )F p b J b J appears to be the most natural candidate for a 
fitness-landscape function.  If so, this raises the question of whether the set of equilibria 
found by the hill-climbing algorithm (5.3) and the bottom-seeking version of (5.3), where 
we multiply the right side of (5.3) by –1, will contain the equilibrium that corresponds to 
**( , )p b J .  Provided that we grid the simplex 1
1
{( ,..., ) | 1}
N
N k
k
p p p
=
=  of non-negative 
probability vectors finely enough and solve the dynamical system (5.3) from each of 
these gridded initial conditions, we can be fairly certain that we will find all the “natural” 
equilibria and hence find the equilibrium we seek, **( , )p b J .   
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Some may argue for the use of a process other than (5.3), and we reiterate that it 
is only an example of a plausible candidate out-of-equilibrium process.  Whatever one’s 
view is on the usefulness of this particular process for implementing Samuelson’s 
correspondence principle, any estimation method of the fitness function, 
( / )
1 1
1
( ; , ) ln (1/ ) ln (1/ ) ,k k
N N
V bV
k k
F p b J N e N e
b

= =
    	= =  
        
which we implemented for estimation purposes above as the quantity tˆF  using 
observational data, is likely to be estimated only on equilibria that are “stable” with 
respect to some out-of-equilibrium adjustment process, assuming the system is in 
equilibrium in the first place. The vexing issue of how to usefully model how particular 
equilibria are actually approached by a social system remains an open problem.   
 
6.  Computing multiple equilibria  
In summary, we have defined a fitness function F(p; b,J), which is a modification 
of the Anderson et al. (1992, eq. 2.37) “social surplus” function, which itself is the 
expected value of the optimal decision, at a particular b,J coordinate with an optimal 
division of popularities, given by the vector of probabilities, pk, for each choice k = 1, 2, 
…, N among N options.  We use a Lyapunov function, H(p;b, J), to find each natural 
equilibrium with respect to (5.1), or, equivalently, (5.3), which is the same system up to 
speed of convergence.  Because there might be multiple peaks that are locally stable, we 
initialize our dynamical system over a range of pk(0).  In this way, we are able to find all 
of the natural equilibria and evaluate ( ; , )F p b J at each of these.  If **( , )p b J  is the 
choice probability vector that gives the largest value of ( ; , )F p b J  over the set of natural 
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equilibria, the fitness landscape will plot as ( **( , ); , )F p b J b J .  This entire landscape 
depends on Uk, the vector of utilities for all the different choices k = 1, 2,…, N, and could 
potentially be quite different for a different vector of intrinsic utilities of the N different 
choices.  
To sum up the relations among these variables, we have  
1
1
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F( p;b, J ) = 1
b
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1
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ebUk+bJpk
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N

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,and (6.2)
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=   .                                  ( 6.3)
Note that 
1
( ; , ) 1
N
k
k
f p b J
=
=
            (6.4) 
for all (p;b,J), such that pk (t)
k=1
N = 1  for all dates t. For given values of b and J, we use 
computer simulation to follow the gradient given by the Lypunov function.  In this 
simulation, we must first specify the intrinsic utilities of all N choices by the vector U.  
These intrinsic utility values do not change through the simulation.  We then choose an 
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initial set of pk values from p1,  p2,  p3, . . . pN, the sum of which is one.  In the case of our 
diagrams for N = 2 and N = 3, respectively, this means
1 2
1 2 3
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
p t p t
p t p t p t
+ =
+ + =
(6.5)
for all dates t for the dynamics (we deleted t in the notation to avoid confusion). 
Each value of N corresponds to a different fitness-landscape function of (b, J) 
for each N.  We can plug into equation 5.3 each pair of b and J values to obtain a partial 
derivative for each pk value.  The resulting vector of partial derivatives, (H/p1, H/p2 
… 	H/pN), multiplied by our chosen scalar step size h (we used h = 0.02), points us one 
step up the hill of H(p;b, J).  We follow this iteratively until the gradient vector 
approaches zero, at which point we have found an equilibrium fitness peak at that map 
coordinate of (b, J).  Fig. 3 shows features of the algorithm for N = 2, b = 5 and J = 1. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 3 
______________________ 
 
The choice of p(0) can matter even for a binary choice, N = 2.  Fig. 4 (after 
Lahkar and Sandholm 2008) shows, for N = 2, how the equilibrium point changes as a 
function of the initial starting value, p0, for different pairs of utility values at the same 
coordinate of b = 5 and J = 1.  Arrows show the direction of flow toward attractors and 
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away from repellors.  For Fig. 4 the utility values of the two choices were set at 0.5 and 
0.4, respectively, and the attractors in this case are 100% for either choice, such that if p1 
is greater than about 40% at time 0, it goes to the peak at 100% p1; otherwise it goes to 
the other peak at 100% p2.  The fitness value in this case, describing the highest overall 
fitness, is at 100% p1, which has the higher intrinsic utility. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 4 
______________________ 
 
When we increase to N = 3, the terrain becomes considerably more rugged, with 
basins of attraction and areas of repulsion within a space defined by (p1, p2, p3).  Fig. 5 
shows these landscapes for the selected combinations of b and J, with each set at 1, 5, or 
10.  Utilities for the three choices were fixed at U1 = 0.5, U2 = 0.4, and U3 =  0.3.  In each 
plot, the axes show the values of p1 and p2, the combination of which determines also p3 = 
1 – (p1 + p2).  Within the space, arrows point uphill toward the peak defined by the 
Lypunov gradient.  Empty spaces, or “corridors,” show areas of repulsion, with all arrows 
pointing away.  
 
______________________ 
Figure 5 
______________________ 
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 Under these parameters, the space for b = 1 and J = 1 shows one attractor at 
approximately (p1, p2, p3)  = (0.38, 0.32, 0.29).  From this situation, if we increase b to 5, 
keeping J = 1, the one attractor in the middle becomes three attractors at the corners, near 
100% p1, p2 or p3, respectively, with clear corridors of repulsion dividing their respective 
basins of attraction (Fig. 5).  Interestingly, the effect is similar when we increase J to 5, 
keeping b = 1, or increase both b and J to 5 (Fig. 5): attractors at 100% for one of the 
three choices, with clear boundaries in between.  As we increase b and J toward 10 for 
each, these three areas resolve themselves very clearly (Fig. 5). 
To explore how this transition happens, we can hold b constant and look at what 
happens when we vary the east–west coordinate, J, the strength of social influence.  
Holding b = 5 constant, as we increase J, we find some interesting developments in terms 
of both the final fitness values (Fig. 6, left) and the hill-climbing gradient H/p1 (Fig. 6, 
right). When social influence is small, J  0.1, we see a fairly sharp transition from 
positive to negative hill-climbing gradient H/p1 (Fig. 6, lower right).  When J is larger, 
1  J  2, however, we find a step transition in final fitness at lower p1, such that a small 
increase in initial p1 yields a substantial increase in final fitness (Fig. 6, upper left).
Along this discontinuity, there is also a slight slope such that a small change in social 
transparency, J, would also abruptly change the fitness, but only very close to the 
discontinuity (Fig. 6, upper left).
______________________ 
Figure 6 
______________________ 
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The sensitivity to initial p vectors shows that in order to account for potential 
multiple fitness peaks at each b, J coordinate, we need to find all equilibria, which could 
number N or fewer at each coordinate.  Hence, in order to generate a final fitness map in 
b, J space for N = 3 (Fig. 7), we need to choose a sufficient range of different starting 
vectors, p(0), to cover the space of possible p vectors and then, for each different p(0), 
follow the gradient of H/p1, H/p2 … 	H/pN to its corresponding fitness peak.  After 
checking for multiple equilibria and retaining the maximum fitness value for each, this 
algorithm is repeated for discrete choices of b and J to fill in the map in pixelated fashion 
(Fig. 7).  The computation time increases exponentially with the number of choices, N, 
which is why Fig. 7 shows the b, J map for a relatively modest value of N = 3.  Keep in 
mind this map corresponds to a specific assignment of utility values for the three different 
choices; different utility values would yield a different b, J map.  
 
______________________ 
Figure 7 
______________________ 
 
As we can see, the space of potential fitness landscapes is enormous, and further 
exploration will need to be strategic.  In one exploration we might determine the 
maximum fitness peak at each b, J coordinate for higher numbers of choices (N > 3) 
without retaining the results for “sublandscapes” of hill climbing, like those in Fig. 5, in 
finding these peaks at every b, J coordinate.  Each landscape depends on the vector of 
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utility values as well, so we would then plot a landscape in b, J space for N = 3, N = 4 and 
so on, for each specified vector of intrinsic utility values, U1, U2, …, UN.  Alternatively, 
we may also want to focus on the sublandscapes that emerge at these higher N values to 
determine whether fitness peaks appear at intermediate combinations of  (p1, p2, p3) rather 
than at the corners close to 100% for one of the choices (Fig. 5).  
 
7. Conclusion 
We applied discrete-choice theory to construct a fitness landscape over a two-
dimensional surface representing transparency of choice and social influence, 
heuristically represented as orthogonal dimensions.  In Section 3 we presented an
estimating equation (3.4) that can be parameterized and showed how the parameters 
1 2, ,    can be estimated once one has the appropriate data sets, which we discussed 
only briefly, given that actual estimation is beyond the scope of this article.  We defined a 
“transparency” function, ( , )itb z , as the inverse of the standard deviation of the random 
component of utility.  By experimenting with different specifications of the function 
( , )itb z and splitting the data set into subperiods of time, one may formulate and test 
hypotheses as to whether decision making becomes more precise, i.e., ( , )itb z  increases 
with time, or less precise, i.e., ( , )itb z  decreases over time.  Also, hypotheses can be 
formulated and tested as to whether certain observable characteristics of individual 
decision makers are associated with more or less precision in decision making.  Whereas 
we used linear specifications of the personal component of the utility difference, other
specifications can be made and estimated as appropriate to other hypotheses of interest.
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Finally, because the function 2( , )itJ y   can be specified, the parameter vector, 2 , can be 
estimated and used to test hypotheses involving the potential presence of social-
interaction effects.  For example, one could test the null hypothesis of zero social 
interaction effects, ( 2( , ) 0itJ y  = ).
The decision map we created has a close analogy with field studies of social 
animals.  For example, in their study of how wild olive baboons in Kenya decide how and 
where to move across the landscape, Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) use a two-
dimensional map that plots directional agreement on the vertical axis and the number of 
initiators of movement on the horizontal axis.  We view directional agreement as 
analogous to transparency, (b), and number of initiators as close to degree of social 
influence, (J). It is a convenient coincidence that Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) 
oriented their axes in the same way as ours (Fig. 1).  In addition, the observed probability 
function of a baboon following subgroup 1 rather than subgroup 2 follows a logistic 
dependence on the numerical difference between the two subgroups (Strandburg-Peshkin 
et al. 2015), which is equivalent to the right hand side of equation 3.4.  Analogous to the 
northeast corner of our map, Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) model the highest 
predictability of baboon-group movement in the space of many initiators and high 
directional agreement.  Interestingly, increasing the number of initiators (social influence) 
without increasing directional agreement (transparency) may actually decrease the 
predictability of followers in the baboon study. 
Having identified social influence and transparency of choice as two key factors 
in how decision frequencies change through time among multiple options, we have 
explored the problem of optimizing decision fitness at the population scale.  This is a 
 33
novel challenge because the fitness depends on both the intrinsic utilities of each choice 
as well as the transparency of social learning that benefits from relative popularity of the 
choice taken.  Using a hill-climbing algorithm, we have explored how this recursive 
relationship effects multiple equilibria, which we define as peaks on the fitness 
landscape.  Among the more surprising results is just how rugged the landscape becomes 
as one moves east on the fitness landscape, as sensitivity to social influence increases.  
The ruggedness is such that we struggle, even through computational methods, to define 
the fitness landscape for even N = 4 different options.  
About a decade ago, a social-psychology experiment showed how the popularity 
of decisions among many similar options becomes less predictable as those decisions are 
made visible (Salganik et al. 2006).  The subjects were choosing among N = 48 online 
music tracks, whose popularity was either visible or invisible.  Besides having an order of 
magnitude more choices than the fitness landscapes we have explored, the social utility of 
each song was probably not directly proportional to its popularity, due to diminishing 
returns.  In future work we could incorporate diminishing returns from growing 
popularity in the social portion of our fitness function.  In other cases, however, the social 
fitness we used here may be appropriate, where popularity does contribute more or less 
directly to overall fitness.  In the world of humans, obvious candidates include financial 
investments or a communication or entertainment technology whose utility grows with 
more users.  In animal culture we might see this be the case, as in chimpanzee tool 
culture, with our model implying that social learning among even a few or several 
different options could bring about a rugged fitness landscape and hence multiple regions 
of different cultural traditions (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999).  For these reasons, we see value 
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in continuing to explore fitness landscapes of discrete choice with social influence.   
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Appendix 1 
Consider the expression 
(A.1)
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Note that when  goes to zero in (A.1), one gets the limiting form .  Apply 
L’Hospital’s Rule of basic calculus and differentiate both the numerator and the 
denominator of (A.1) with respect to  to obtain 
(A.2)
This proves the first line of (4.5).  For the second line, suppose without loss of generality, 
that .  Then, 
(A.3)
because .  This proves the second line of (4.7). 
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Figures  
 
Fig. 1.  A four-quadrant map for understanding different domains of human decision 
making, based on whether a decision is made individually or socially (horizontal axis) 
and the transparency of options and payoffs that inform a decision (vertical axis) (after 
Bentley et al., 2014). 
 
Fig. 2.  Map comparing nonlinear least-squares estimates (blue dots) against simulations 
(red dots) of the model defined by equation 2.0 (after Brock et al. 2014, fig. 4).  The 
simulated data for variables xi1gt, xi0gt, yigt , and zigt were each independently chosen from 
values normally distributed through time t with mean 10, with the variance for the 
payoffs xi1gt and xi0gt set at 0.01 and the variance for yigt and for zigt set at 1.  For individual 
i in group g at time t, the payoff difference between options 1 and 0 is represented by xi1gt 
- xi0gt, the presence of social influence is measured by yigt, and zigt represents how variable 
the choices were through time.  As described by Brock et al. (2014), estimating the 
parameter vector , along with the scalar observable z, determines the transparency of 
choice, b(.), and estimating the parameter vector, 2, specifies the social-influence 
function, J(.). Each simulation used 30 time steps, 100 groups, and 200 agents per group 
and noise component i1gt - i0gt, with mean 0 and  = 0.1.  
 
Fig. 3.  Illustration of hill-climbing process for N = 2 choices, of U1 = 0.511 and U2 = 
0.489, respectively, at a specific map coordinate, b = 5 and J = 1.  Among the four plots, 
the top row shows how the Lypunov algorithm converges on p1 and on F over the t time 
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steps, and the bottom left shows p1/dt against p1.  The bottom right shows the 
equilibrium probability at the end of the hill-climbing algorithm.  In this example, the 
fitness was maximized through 100% choice 2. 
 
Fig. 4.  A vector figure for N = 2, b = 5, and J = 1, with utility values U1 = 0.5 and U2 = 
0.4.  The line represents p1 + p2 = 1, along which each initial p1(0) shows arrows that 
point at that line in the direction of dp1/dt starting at p1(0).  Each arrow has a length 
proportional to the size of dp1/dt.  Note that dp2/dt = –dp1/dt.   
 
Fig. 5.  Plots for N = 3, with utility values U1 = 0.5, U2 = 0.4 and U3 = 0.3.  The nine 
plots in the grid show three different values for both b and J.  For plots on the left, the 
vertical axis shows final fitness, F; plots on the right show hill-climbing gradient H/p1. 
 
Fig. 6.  Image plots for N = 3, with b = 5, where p1 is varied but we set p3 = 3p2; that is, p2 
= (1–p1)/4 and p3 =
  3(1–p1)/4.  In the plots on the left, the colors show the final fitness 
values, with numbers next to “+” symbols showing the value along selected contours.  On
the right, colors and contour values indicate the hill-climbing gradient H/p1.  In the 
lower right, where J  0.1, note the fairly sharp transition from positive to negative hill-
climbing gradient H/p1. In the upper right, where 1  J  2, note the step transition in 
final fitness at lower p1, such that a small increase in initial p1 would yield a substantial 
increase in final fitness.
 44
Fig. 7.  Contour plot of the b, J map showing the maximum fitness for N = 3.  To find 
these maximum fitness values, the hill-climbing process was followed at b, J coordinate.  
At each coordinate, multiple hill-climbing searches were made over a range of initial 
probability vectors for the three choices: p1(0), p2(0) and p3(0).  The maximum fitness 
was then retained at each b, J coordinate. 
 
Title: “Fitness landscapes among many options under social influence” 
 By Camila C. S. Caiado, William A. Brock, R. Alexander Bentley and Michael J. O’Brien 
Highlights 
x In our paper, we identify three important factors among organisms that learn socially: (1) 
social influence, (2) transparency, or intensity, of choice, and (3) change through time.   
x We explore this model in terms of the fitness-landscape function in the spirit of Sewell 
Wright. 
x We employ a hill-climbing algorithm that leads to the expected values of the optimal 
decisions, which we define as peaks on the fitness landscape. 
x We find that, with social utility included, there are multiple equilibria and each point on the 
fitness landscape, which is rugged even for N = 3 choices. The number of equilibria should 
be less than or equal to the number of choices N.
x The utility of social influence implies that maximum fitness can be highly sensitive to initial 
conditions (choice frequencies).   
x In terms of behavioural ecology, our model suggest that initial conditions and path 
dependence should be considered in models of optimal group behaviours among social  
organisms.
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